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Abstract 
We measure annual report commentary articulating entities’ business model and strategy, and 
then examine the capital market effects of enhancing such disclosure. Our empirical disclosure 
proxy is based on n-grams drawn from popular strategy textbooks and the academic strategy 
literature. Validation tests confirm that our score: (a) correlates with manual classifications of the 
quality of strategy-focused disclosures produced by domain experts; (b) covaries predictably 
with firm-level drivers of strategy-focused disclosures identified by prior research; and (c) 
captures the structural break in reporting associated with the regulatory mandate for a subset of 
London Stock Exchange firms to explain their strategy and business model. Tests using this 
exogenous and measurable increase in strategy-focused disclosure show that enhanced 
commentary on strategy and business model is associated with lower investor uncertainty. We 
also find support for an increase in the speed at which information is incorporated into stock 
price following the annual report release. 
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Annual Report Commentary on the Value Creation Process 
1. Introduction 
Daimler AG’s 2017 annual report contains six pages of commentary articulating its 
strategic objectives and business model for creating and preserving shareholder value. KPMG 
(2016) highlight a growing international trend for such commentary as policymakers including 
the US Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) (2001), International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) (2010), UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (2010a), and European 
Commission (EC) (2017) promote disclosure in this area. Reflecting this trend, a recent 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) concepts release aimed at modernizing Regulation 
S-K disclosure requirements seeks views on whether to revise Item 101(a)(1) to require registrants 
to describe their business strategy in the Management Discussion and Analysis (SEC 2016: 60). The 
value of such discourse is nevertheless unclear (EY 2015). We shed light on this evolving area of 
annual reporting by evaluating the impact of annual report descriptions of the value creation 
process on the quality of firms’ information environment. 
 Strategy and business model define the value creation process. Information on business 
models helps investors understand an entity’s resource requirements, priorities for action, and 
prospects (FASB 2001: 14-15, IASB 2010: 12). Business models articulate the system of inputs, 
activities and outputs required to generate cash flows and create long term value, and are framed 
by the entity’s strategic objectives and plans to achieve them.1 Business model and strategy 
reporting is considered a central element of effective annual report commentary (International 
                                                 
1 Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010) argue that a business model reflects an entity’s realized strategy: business 
model describes the way a firm operates and how it creates value, while strategy refers to the contingent choice of 
business model. The two concepts coincide in simple competitive situations but are distinct in the presence of 
important contingencies on which a well-designed strategy is based. We use the term strategy-related reporting 
hereinafter as shorthand for both aspects, as well as for the value creation process broadly defined. Given the close 
alignment between strategy and business model we do not attempt to distinguish empirically between the concepts.   
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Integrated Reporting Council [IIRC] 2011, Guillaume 2018: 7). Market participants view annual 
report commentary on strategy, business model inputs (e.g., innovation and assets) and business 
model outcomes (e.g., financial results and value created) as a distinct disclosure element that 
provides an important contextual framework for interpreting other aspects of financial reporting 
(FASB 2001, FRC 2016).2 For example, 78% (64%) of buy-side (sell-side) analysts surveyed by 
PwC (2017) agree that annual report descriptions of strategy, opportunities, and value drivers 
impact their work directly. Understanding how firms compete and differentiate themselves is also 
a key theme highlighted by analysts surveyed by Brown et al. (2016: 145). Management’s 
reluctance or inability to explain the value creation process is predicted to create doubt over 
leadership quality and may restrict capital flows (FRC 2016, Gu and Li 2007). 
Clear and comprehensive corporate reporting on value creation is critical given that over 
half the analysts surveyed by PwC (2017) highlight the need for more annual report commentary 
on this topic. However, evidence on the usefulness of value creation descriptions is limited to 
voluntary and partial disclosure outside the annual report such as innovation plans (Gu and Li 
2007), management guidance on specific strategic initiatives such as store openings and 
schedules for clinical trials (Lu and Tucker 2010), and management presentations (Baginski et al. 
2018). The usefulness of annual report disclosures articulating how an entity creates and 
maintains shareholder value through its business model and strategy therefore remains an open 
question despite persistent external pressure for firms to provide such information (IASB 2010, 
FRC 2010a, IIRC 2013, Lev and Gu 2016, EC 2017, PwC 2017). 
                                                 
2 While it is challenging to fully disentangle commentary on strategy from general corporate reporting, recent 
guidelines clearly view a formal description of the process for creating and maintaining value as distinct from, and 
incremental to, standard financial commentary on performance and financial position (European Financial Reporting 
Advisory Group 2013, IIRC 2013, IASB 2010, FRC 2010a). Consistent with this view, Lev and Gu (2016) propose a 
strategic resources report as a way for organisations to explain how they create and preserve competitive advantage. 
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Proponents of business model and strategy descriptions argue that investors require such 
information to fully process the performance and value implications of accounting results and 
corporate investment decisions. The importance of investors’ preexisting information set as a 
basis for conditioning their interpretation of new information is supported by theory (Verrecchia 
1980, Callen et al. 2013). The contextualizing role of the annual report is also consistent with 
claims that these documents represent a primary source of non-financial information for investors 
(IASB 2010, ACCA and Eurosif 2013: 4, IIRC 2013, EY 2015, Brown et al. 2016).3 Skeptics on 
the other hand question the value of annual report disclosures generally (Chen and Li 2015: 183, 
White 2013) and argue that descriptions of business model and strategy are especially prone to 
bland, boilerplate statements that offer few meaningful insights (EY 2015, Santema and Van De 
Rijt 2001). The value of such disclosures is particularly pertinent for financial reporting given 
concerns about unfettered growth in the volume of annual report disclosure and problems posed 
by the inclusion of irrelevant content (SEC 2013, IASB 2017, FRC 2009, 2011). 
We test whether descriptions of the value creation process improve firms’ information 
environment by exploiting a revision in the UK Corporate Governance Code requiring London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) Main Market firms (but not their Alternative Investment Market 
counterparts) to explain business model and strategy in their annual report (FRC 2010a). We 
measure value creation commentary using a comprehensive list of n-grams relating to firm 
strategy and business model drawn from popular strategy textbooks and the academic strategy 
literature. Since many words appearing frequently in business model- and strategy-focused 
commentary also occur naturally in general business reporting (e.g., “acquisition” and 
                                                 
3 Black Sun Plc reports that 84% of long-term investors use the annual report to evaluate corporate strategy and 53% 




“industry”), we apply two disambiguation procedures to ensure strategy-related n-grams reflect 
value creation content (i.e. to reduce Type I errors in our word frequency score). First, we 
concentrate on annual report sections more likely to contain disclosures on the value creation 
process such as summary highlights, letter from the board chair and management commentary. 
Second, we weight each n-gram by the conditional probability that it is predictive of an 
objectively classified corpus of value creation commentary constructed from unambiguous 
disclosures that describe strategy, business model, and key performance indicators. N-grams in 
our list that characterize the value creation corpus receive a weight closer to one in our score 
whereas those less descriptive of the corpus receive a weight closer (or equal) to zero. Estimates 
based on our score indicate an 11-page (79%) average incremental increase in value creation 
annual report commentary for LSE Main Market firms relative to AIM firms in response to the 
FRC (2010a) disclosure mandate. 
We evaluate construct validity by comparing disclosure rankings generated by our score 
against double-blind classifications of the quality of value creation commentary produced by two 
domain experts. Our score yields precision and recall rates (Manning and Schütze 1999) that 
typically exceed 80% for reports classified manually as containing high and low quality strategy-
related commentary. We supplement this analysis with large-sample evidence. Causality tests 
confirm the ability of our score to detect the post-2010 incremental increase in strategy-related 
annual report disclosure mandated for LSE Main Market firms. Association tests demonstrate 
that our score correlates with factors predicted by prior research to explain variation in the level 
of strategy-focused disclosure such as firm-level operational complexity and competition. 
Consistent with value creation commentary being a distinct dimension of management 
commentary, our results are robust to controls for other disclosure features including length, 
forward-lookingness, and Li et al.’s (2013) text-based measure of competition. We also 
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demonstrate that the 2010 structural break does not load in placebo tests using proxies for total 
report disclosure, consistent with our score capturing disclosure changes that are distinct from 
any general growth in annual report content.  
We then assess whether annual report commentary on the value creation process helps 
investors resolve uncertainty by exploiting the exogenous and demonstrable shock to reporting 
practices for LSE Main Market firms resulting from the 2010 disclosure mandate. Difference-in-
differences (DID) tests reveal a statistically and economically significant incremental decrease in 
bid-ask spread, analyst forecast dispersion, and absolute analyst forecast errors on earnings for 
LSE Main Market firms (relative to their AIM counterparts) in the post-2010 period. Robustness 
tests for bid-ask spread using the synthetic control method yield similar findings (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal 2003). Conclusions also hold using a proxy for firms experiencing the largest 
increase in our score after the 2010 mandate, suggesting that our DID findings are not 
attributable to other unobservable regulatory changes that may have occurred in the post-2010 
period, although we acknowledge the difficulty of ruling out this possibility entirely. We also 
document weaker evidence of a post-2010 reduction in stock price delay following the annual 
report release date (Callen et al. 2013). Finally and as predicted, cross-section tests reveal larger 
information gains for firms with low analyst coverage prior to the regulatory change. 
Collectively, our evidence supports the view that annual report descriptions of business model 
and strategy enhance firms’ information environment. 
We make several contributions to the literature. We extend evidence on the usefulness of 
voluntary strategy-related disclosures (Gu and Li 2007, Lu and Tucker 2010, Bagniski et al. 
2018) to a more complete description of the value creation process presented in firms’ annual 
reports. Specifically, we focus on managements’ detailed articulation of their overall strategic 
vision and how value is delivered within the framework defined by that vision. Our analysis 
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therefore speaks directly to claims in the financial statement analysis literature that clarity on 
firms’ competitive environment and approach to operating in that setting provides the 
foundations for effective accounting and financial analysis (Palepu et al. 2010, Penman 2013).  
We also contribute to debate on the usefulness of annual report disclosures. While 
practitioners stress the importance of the annual report for financial analysis and investment 
decision-making, research provides mixed evidence on the usefulness of such disclosures. Our 
analysis helps reconcile these views by studying an aspect of disclosure that aligns naturally with 
the accepted view of the annual report as a reference document and source of contextual 
information. Information on value creation provides the framework for understanding how 
activities and results map into future value; and before the 2010 disclosure mandate UK firms did 
not articulate their value proposition routinely and comprehensively through other reporting 
channels. Our evidence that enhanced annual report commentary leads to demonstrable capital 
market benefits supports the usefulness of this enduring and ubiquitous feature of corporate 
reporting. In related work, Barth et al. (2016) show that integrated reporting quality correlates 
with lower information asymmetry proxied by bid-ask spreads. The value creation process is a 
central theme in integrated reporting (IIRC 2011). Our findings extend Barth et al. (2016) by 
demonstrating how specific disclosures relating to business model and strategic vision improve 
the quality of firms’ information environment.  
Finally, our study is the first attempt of which we are aware to develop a comprehensive 
measure of strategy-related disclosures using automated scoring methods. We demonstrate that 
our score captures information beyond Li et al.’s (2013) proxy for competition. Construct 
validity tests suggest that our score captures aspects of disclosure quantity and quality. The proxy 
is transparent and simple to implement, broad in nature, and applicable to other disclosure 
settings such as conference calls and analyst reports. 
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2. Literature and disclosure practice 
2.1 The contextual role of commentary describing the value creation process 
Detailed annual report commentary on business model and strategy offers important 
contextual information to aid outsiders’ understanding of the mapping from operating activities 
into cash flows and ultimately shareholder value (FASB 2001, IASB 2010, FRC 2016). 
Specifically, descriptions of the value creation process encompassing strategy and business 
model provide a framework to help investors understand the implications of decisions and events 
on the timing and magnitude of cash flows. Lev and Gu (2016: 117) emphasize the critical role 
that contextual information on strategy plays when analyzing complex business organizations 
subject to competition and fast changing technologies. Reflecting the rising importance of 
management descriptions of the value creation process, regulators and market participants are 
increasingly placing strategy and business model at the center of the annual report.  
Explicit consideration of the contextual role of information lies beyond the scope of most 
mainstream disclosure models where management is endowed with private information that will 
impact firm value when communicated credibly [see Stocken (2012) for a survey]. Rather than 
conveying direct news about cash flows and firm value, contextualizing commentary on business 
model and strategy establishes the broader information framework that determines how firm-
specific performance snapshots and events affect value. Greater clarity on business model and 
strategy can therefore enhance the precision of investors’ private information set and 
consequently their ability to evaluate and process new information (Verrecchia 1980). While not 
necessarily informative in its own right, greater transparency about business model and strategy 
therefore has the capacity to improve the overall quality of disclosers’ information environment 
in at least two ways. First, it improves the processing ability of investors who were previously 
unable to access such information themselves, thereby helping to level the information playing 
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field for non-professional investors. Second, it reduces search costs for investors who previously 
sought to generate such information privately. 
Arguments in the literature concerning the provision of strategy-related commentary are 
consistent with such disclosure playing a contextual role. For example, clarity on the value 
creation process is important for identifying key corporate success and risk factors that in turn 
can help pinpoint critical accounting policies and performance measures (Palepu et al. 2010). 
Careful analysis of business model and strategy also aids the task of forecasting earnings and 
cash flows by helping to identify sustainable performance and growth potential (Palepu et al. 
2010, Penman 2013). Consistent with these claims, research suggests that analysts view 
information on strategy as more important than quarterly results (Higgins and Diffenbach 1985). 
Information on how strategic objectives and planning inform firms’ operating and financial plans 
can also shed light on management quality (Kohut and Segards 1992, Gu and Li 2007). 
Supporting the view that strategy-related news lowers investor uncertainty, Lu and 
Tucker (2012) find that forward-looking signals in strategic plan disclosures contained in 
earnings press releases are associated with a decrease in bid-ask spreads and that disclosing firms 
experience an incremental increase in market depth. In addition, Gu and Li (2007) document a 
positive market reaction to press release disclosures of innovation strategy. Collectively, these 
findings suggest that investors value forward-looking plans about specific strategic initiatives. 
In contrast, the role of detailed annual report descriptions of value creation centered on business 
model and strategy remains unexplored in the literature. Doubt exists over the usefulness of such 
broad descriptions. First, proprietary costs may constrain the amount of detail managers are 
willing to provide in the annual report for fear of revealing valuable private information their 
firm’s competitive advantage (Verrecchia 1983, Li et al. 2013). In addition to hiding information, 
proprietary costs may lead management to obfuscate (bias) disclosures on business model and 
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strategy to mislead competitors and deter entrants (Li et al. 2013). Second, demand for simplicity 
coupled with proprietary cost considerations may encourage bland descriptions that offer few 
new insights or specific details regarding quantitative objectives, how these objectives are 
monitored, and the action plans needed to realize the desired strategy (Santema and Van De Rijt 
2001). Third, to the extent an entity’s business model is an implicit, unarticulated set of ideas in 
the minds of the individuals who lead the organization, there is a risk that disclosures may simply 
provide a message that managers agree to tell outsiders when asked to explain their value 
creation approach rather than the fluid and uncertain set of ideas that actually drives the business 
(Langfield-Smith 1997: 210). Fourth, calls for more disclosure on business models are 
complicated by the absence of an agreed definition of the concept in the literature (Sinfield et al 
2012: 86, European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 2013) 
Collectively, these doubts cast a shadow over the value of annual report descriptions of 
value creation despite increasing pressure on management to report such information. Evidence 
regarding the usefulness of this growing reporting trend is therefore overdue given concern about 
the expanding role of the annual report and the costs associated with inclusion of irrelevant 
disclosures (SEC 2013, IASB 2017). 
 
2.2 Reporting recommendations and requirements   
Professional accounting firms (Deloitte 2009) and business associations including the 
CFA Institute (2006) and the US Chamber of Commerce (2007) argue that firms should provide 
details on long-term value drivers, initiatives and strategies as an alternative to (quarterly) 
earnings guidance to help mitigate short-termism and bolster investor confidence in the 
management. Although Exchange Act Release No 34-48960 recommends the Management 
Discussion and Analysis section of the 10-K filing includes a discussion of competitive position,  
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and guidelines on the content of 10-K annual report filings for US registrants refer to “a 
statement of plans and objectives of management” as an example of information that may be 
included in forward-looking statements (Ernst and Young 2011: 2-22), the SEC does not require 
registrants to provide explicit information on corporate objectives, strategy or business model.  
The IASB published a non-binding practice statement, effective December 8, 2010, on 
management commentary promoting disclosures that contribute to an understanding of firms’ 
objectives, strategies for meeting those objectives, and the resources that must be managed to 
deliver results (IASB 2010, para. 24, 27 and 28). Both the European Financial Reporting 
Advisory Group (EFRAG) and the IIRC emphasize the need for clear disclosure on business 
model in firms’ annual reports (EFRAG 2013, IIRC 2013). In response, the EC (2017) issued 
non-binding guidelines for Directive 2014/95/EU (disclosure of non-financial information) that 
encourage reporting on business models. 
From 2006, best practice in the UK saw some firms voluntarily disclosing information on 
business model and strategy, often within the business review section of the annual report 
required by the Companies Act 2006 (Section 417) (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012). An 
influential House of Commons Treasury Committee report (2009, para. 247) nevertheless argued 
that most firms failed to provide clear information and called for more detail on management’s 
approach to creating and preserving value. The proposal was formalized in a landmark revision 
to the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2010a). Specifically, paragraph C.1.2 of the 2010 
version of the UK Corporate Governance Code, effective for 12-month reporting periods ending 
on or after June 28, 2011, states:  
“… directors should include in the annual report an explanation of the basis on which 
the company generates or preserves value over the longer term (the business model) and 
the strategy for delivering the objectives of the company.” 
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The provisions of the Code apply to all firms with a listing of equity shares on the LSE 
Main Market.4 The Code does not prescribe how or where firms should provide such 
commentary, although a footnote to paragraph C.1.2 recommends locating disclosures in the 
same section as the business review section. Paragraph C.1.2 represented the only substantive 
disclosure change in the 2010 of the UK Code Governance Code (FRC 2010b: 10-12).  
 
3. Measuring value creation disclosure 
 This section explains our approach to measuring annual report commentary on the value 
creation process relating to business model and strategy (hereinafter, strategy-focused 
commentary). As strategy and the business model are key to the value creation process, for 
simplicity in this section we refer to this commentary as strategy related commentary. Our 
starting point involves deriving a comprehensive list of business model- and strategy-related 
keywords and phrases. In the absence of an appropriate pre-existing wordlist, we derive an 
externally defined preliminary list by pooling all non-duplicate words and n-grams from the 
indexes of following five leading business strategy textbooks: Porter (1985), Barney and Clark 
(2007), Rumelt (2011), Magretta (2012) and Grant (2013). For completeness, we also include n-
grams reported by Ronda-Pupol and Guerras-Martin (2012, Appendices 1a through 1c) in their 
study examining the evolution of the strategy concept in the academic literature. The initial 
pooled list comprises 4,384 words and phrases, which reduces to 3,584 following exclusion of 
proper nouns (firms, products and authors) and other irrelevant content. This list is then curated 
                                                 
4 Financial Conduct Authority Listing Rules give management the option to comply with the provisions of the Code 
or explain in their annual report why they have failed to do so. The requirement to highlight and explain non-
compliance follows the established governance reporting model in the UK, which has been shown to effect structural 
change in governance arrangements due to the reputational damage and increased scrutiny resulting from non-
compliance (Dahya et al. 2002). While non-compliance is therefore an option for management, in reality compliance 
rates approach 100 percent. Guidance on matters to consider when explaining business model is provided by the 
Accounting Standard Board (ASB) (2006, para. 30 to 32).  
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manually and independently by two members of the research team to: (a) remove generic words 
such as “profit” and “asset” that are unlikely to discriminate between strategy-related content and 
other aspects of management commentary; (b) simplify or generalize n-grams and lemmatize 
keywords;5 (c) expand the list to include inflections and plurals, and alternative English or 
American spellings; and (d) add disambiguation conditions. Disagreements between coders are 
reviewed and reconciled. The final list of strategy n-grams comprises 709 elements that nest 
2,907 (81%) of the 3,584 words and phrases in the initial filtered list. Appendix A presents the 
final n-gram list together with further details of the procedure used to construct it. We also 
provide full reconciliation of the initial and final lists in an online appendix (doi: 
10.17635/lancaster/researchdata/232).  
While our manually curated wordlist is constructed with the goal of disambiguation in 
mind, it is nevertheless likely that some elements will occur frequently in discussions unrelated 
to the value creation process. For example, words like “acquire” and “acquisition” occur 
throughout the annual report in non-strategy-related contexts. Failure to disambiguate context 
and meaning is a widely acknowledged problem associated with a bag-of-words approach 
(Loughran and McDonald 2016). We apply the following two refinements to minimize risk of 
false positives. First, we restrict our focus to the subset of annual report sections where value 
creation commentary is more likely to occur. Specifically, we exclude all report sections that 
form part of the audited financial statements on the basis that text in these sections relates 
                                                 
5 For example, the n-gram “market share” is removed because it is subsumed in the more general “market” n-gram 
that nests alternative phrasing such as “share of market”, share of the market”, and “share in the market”, as well as 
synonyms such as “market fraction”, “fraction of the market”, “market take”, etc.    
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primarily to accounting treatments, as well as corporate governance statements and remuneration 
reports where commentary is shaped to a large degree by regulatory compliance.6 
Our second disambiguation procedure weights the frequency of the kth n-gram by the 
conditional probability that it is predictive of strategy-focused commentary:  
    k kkjj keywordScountStratScore |Pr ,     (1) 
where StratScore is our weighted measure of strategy-related commentary for the jth report, count 
is the frequency count of the kth n-gram, and )|Pr( kkeywordS  is the n-gram-specific conditional 
probability that element k is associated with commentaries that unambiguously contain value 
creation content. StratScore is an unscaled measure of strategy-related commentary because we 
seek to capture the absolute amount of disclosure rather than the proportion of total disclosure 
devoted to business model and strategy. We control for scale effects by including a proxy for 
annual report length in our empirical models (Kravet et al. 2013), but for completeness we also 
present results estimated using a scaled version of the measure.  
N-gram-specific conditional probabilities in equation (1) are derived using the following 
corpus-based application of Bayes rule. We first construct a corpus of business model and 
strategy commentary by exploiting headings listed in the tables of contents to identify all sections 
from our sample of annual reports that unambiguously contain strategy-related commentary. 
Specifically, we use a java script to search all tables of contents section headers (S) for keywords 
“strategy”, “strategies”, “strategic”, “business model”, “key performance indicator”, and “KPI”. 
                                                 
6 The consequence of this filtering approach is that it risks understanding the incidence of strategy-related 
commentary by increasing the probability of Type II errors. Given the disambiguation problems associated with 
applying wordlists, the benefit of reducing Type I errors likely outweighs the corresponding cost of increasing Type 
II errors. To assess the sensitivity of our results to our section filtering approach, we repeated the analysis after 
retaining governance statements and remuneration reports on the basis that they are the next most likely candidates 
to contain strategy-related commentary. Inferences from tests using this alternative subset of annual report sections 
are identical to those reported in the main body of the paper.   
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Section titles that include at least one of these keywords are classified as strategy sections ( S  ); 
and pooling content across all S  yields our corpus of strategy-related commentary. We also 
create a corpus of general annual report narrative commentary by pooling content from all S 
sections across the report sample. We then apply Bayes rule to derive the conditional probability 
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  = Count of n-gram k in all strategic sections of the annual report corpus; 
K  = set of 709 n-grams; 
k  = n-gram k, k = 1… 709; 
s = annual report section subscript; 
S   = pooled set of narrative sections in the annual report corpus; 
𝑆′ = pooled set of strategic narrative sections in the annual report corpus. 
Equation (2a) is the probability that n-gram k occurs in the corpus of annual report narratives; 
equation (2b) is the probability that n-gram k appears in the corpus of strategy-related 
commentary; and equation (2c) is the probability of the section being strategic when n-gram k is 
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present. The conditional probability for k given S   is invariant over time and across firms 
because S   and S are created by pooling across all reports in the sample. 
Equation (2) assigns a weight of zero to any n-gram k that never appears in the corpus of 
strategy-focused commentary. We also set equation (2) to zero for any k that has a lower 
proportion of occurrences in the strategy corpus relative to the full annual report narratives 
corpus. Applying these zero weights reduces the number of elements in K from 709 to 231. (See 
Appendix A, Panel A, for the list of non-zero weighted n-grams.) The high incidence of zero-
weighted elements is consistent with the regular occurrence of strategy keywords in non-strategy-
specific commentary. Accordingly, the value of StratScorej from equation (1) measuring the 
level of strategy-related content in a given annual report is equal to the weighted sum of the 231 
non-zero-weighted n-grams from K. Section 5 reports results of tests evaluating the validity of 
StratScore as proxy for annual report commentary on business model and strategy.  
 
4. Sample and data 
Annual reports published as PDF files were collected from Perfect Information for all 
LSE Main Market and AIM non-financial firms for fiscal year-ends between July 1, 2002 and 
June 30, 2014. The initial Perfect Information sample comprises 15,954 annual reports, from 
which we exclude regulatory reports, non-English language reports, stand-alone sustainability 
reports, and annual reports for financial periods less than 11 months or greater than 15 months.7 
The sample window starts in 2002 because the availability of digital PDF reports was more 
                                                 
7 There is no UK equivalent to either the 10-K report filed by US registrants or the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s EDGAR system. Instead, UK firms distribute their annual reports as a glossy brochure-style digital 
PDF file (Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015). Contrary to the standardized 10-K annual report template for US 
registrants, no standardized template exists for the narrative component. Instead, management is permitted to locate 
and structure disclosures as they see fit. This is consistent with the general absence of prescriptive disclosure 
templates in UK company law and securities law, a consequence of which is that the specific content and format of 
annual report narratives varies significantly across firms (FRC 2012: 8). 
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limited before this date. We end the sample window in 2014 to limit confounding affects from 
subsequent changes to the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report 
Regulations 2013) that changed the format but not the mandated content of strategy-related 
disclosures. Sample years run July 1, t to 30 June, t + 1 to align with the implementation date for 
the strategy reporting mandate. 
We use the algorithm in El-Haj et al. (2019) to retrieve annual report structure and text 
using the report table of contents. The retrieval procedure is unable to process 1,656 PDF reports 
from the initial sample for the reasons described in El-Haj et al. (2019), the primary one being 
that the PDF is an image-based file. Processed reports are filtered to exclude cases where the 
retrieval process likely results in material error.8 This filtering process excludes 3,855 reports. 
Remaining reports are matched manually with firm-level identifiers from Datastream, resulting in 
the loss of nine observations for which Datastream codes are unavailable. Removing duplicate 
reports due to changes in year-end reduces the sample by a further 76 observations. Finally, 
missing accounting and market data required for our empirical tests reduces the final sample to 
9,127 observations. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process while Panel B 
presents frequency counts of reports by year and firm. Observations are evenly distributed over 
time with the exception of 2002, where the low frequency is due to a higher incidence of image-
based PDF files. The final sample represents approximately 50% of non-financial LSE firms with 
financial statement and market data on Datastream in any given sample year. Most firms (86 
percent) have at least two years of data. 
                                                 
8 Retrieval errors are identified using the following criteria: (a) the narratives component of the annual report 
comprises less than two sections or less than four pages or less than 100 words, or does not contain at least one key 
section (chairman’s statement, performance commentary, governance statement or remuneration report); (b) the 
financial statements component of the report comprises less than four sections or less than five pages or less than 
100 words; (c) the total annual report word count exceeds 150,000 words; and (d) the annual report start page 
determined by our procedure is greater than page eight. 
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Descriptive statistics for StratScore and associated variables based on the sample of 9,127 
reports are presented in Panel A of Table 2. Total word count for the mean (median) annual 
report narrative component excluding the governance statement and remuneration report is 
13,291 (9,317), while the corresponding raw strategy n-gram count is 159 (99). Weighting 
strategy words by their corresponding conditional probability value yields an average (median) 
StratScore value of 21.3 (13) based on the 231 non-zero-weighted n-grams. The median 
conditional probability weight for these 231 n-grams is 0.14, highlighting the universal nature of 
many words and phrases that characterize discussions of business model and strategy in the 
professional and academic literatures.  
To aid economic interpretation we translate StratScore into an estimate of total strategy-
related commentary by regressing annual report narrative page count on StratScore.9 (See 
Appendix B.) The estimated StratScore coefficient mapping strategy-related words into annual 
report narrative content is 0.68 for the full sample. Applying this mapping coefficient to the 
sample average StratScore value of 21.3 from Table 2 implies that a typical report issued during 
the sample period contains 15 pages (0.68 × 21.3) of strategy-relevant content, which equates to 
53% of the 28 pages of narratives in an average report. Appendix B presents separate mapping 
coefficients for Main Market and AIM firms using samples of reports issued before revisions to 
the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 were implemented. Combining these coefficients with 
sample average page counts implies an incremental average increase in strategy-related 
commentary for Main Market firms over their AIM counterparts of 11 pages following 
                                                 
9 We favour page count over word count because casual empiricism suggests that firms provide significant strategy-
related material in infographics and pictures. These potentially important aspects of reports are overlooked using 
word count. Insights are qualitatively similar using word count in place of page count.  
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implementation of the reporting mandate. Whether this additional content helped to improve 
firms’ information environment is an issue we examine empirically in section 6.   
 
5. Construct validity tests 
This section evaluates the validity of StratScore as a measure of strategy-related annual 
report commentary. Section 5.1 reports evidence based on a small sample manual scoring 
approach while section 5.2 presents results of large-sample correlation and causality tests.  
 
5.1 Manual validation 
We use a manual scoring exercise to provide evidence on the validity of our StratScore 
metric. Manual validation by domain experts is considered the most reliable means of assessing 
classification accuracy in the natural language processing literature. Our manual process involves 
the following steps. One co-author (AuthorA) ranked the final sample of annual reports by 
StratScore and constructed three disclosure quality categories: High (top quartile); Low (bottom 
quartile); Medium (all remaining observations).10 AuthorA then selected 20 reports from each 
category at random. The 60 reports were presented blind (i.e., no information on reports’ 
classification and no details of the number of reports selected from each category) to two domain 
expert co-authors (AuthorB and AuthorC). Each report was read and classified independently by 
AuthorB and AuthorC into one of the three quality categories based on an assessment of business 
model and strategy disclosures. AuthorB and AuthorC then returned their independent ratings to 
AuthorA for comparison against StratScore classifications. 
                                                 
10 Consistent with the standard approach applied in natural language processing research, we use a three-level 
classification procedure to reflect the non-binary nature of disclosure quality and to reduce the unconditional 
probability of correctly classifying reports by chance. 
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Classifications by AuthorB and AuthorC agreed for 47 reports (78%). We use these 47 
reports as the gold standard classification against which we assess StratScore’s ability to 
reproduce similar rankings.11 Classification accuracy is assessed using measures of precision and 
recall (Manning and Schütze 1999). Precision measures the incidence of Type I errors and recall 
measures the incidence of Type II errors. Findings are presented in Table 3. The first row reports 
results for low quality classifications. Manual annotators independently classified 21 of 60 
reports as containing low quality disclosures on business model and strategy. Sixteen of these 21 
reports were drawn from the Low StratScore quartile, implying a recall rate of 76% (i.e., type II 
error rate equal to 5/21 or 24%). Two further reports originally drawn from the Low Stratscore 
quartile were not consistently rated as low quality by manual annotators, implying a precision 
rate of 89% (i.e., type I error rate equal to 2/18 or 11%). The same approach is used to compute 
precision and recall rates for Medium and High classifications in rows two and three, 
respectively. Precision and recall rates exceed 80% for High. Total precision and recall rates 
reported in the final row of Table 3 are well above 70% which is considered high for a three-way 
classification problem (Teufel et al. 2006). Findings indicate that StratScore correlates reliably 
with manual classifications of annual report commentary on business model and strategy. 
 
5.2 Large-sample validity tests 
 Next we assess construct validity by correlating StratScore with factors predicted to 
explain variation in the extent of strategy-related annual report commentary, and by testing 
whether StratScore captures the exogenous increase in strategy reporting for LSE Main Market 
                                                 
11 Disagreement between AuthorB and AuthorC on 13 reports highlights the inherent difficulty of scoring strategy-
related disclosure. Nevertheless, inter-rater reliability scores for Cohen’s Kappa and Krippendorff's Alpha are 0.67, 
which are respectable for a three-way classification problem (Teufel et al. 2006). Further analysis reveals that 
StratScore agrees with the classification assigned by one of the two domain experts in 11 of the 13 disagreement 
cases (85%), which provides further evidence that the metric outperforms a random classification benchmark. 
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firms as a consequence of the revision to the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010. Survey 
evidence confirms a significant increase in strategy-related reporting in response to the disclosure 
mandate, effective for fiscal years beginning on or after June 29, 2010 (Deloitte 2012). Critically, 
the rule did not apply to firms listed on the AIM section of the LSE, thereby affording a means of 
identification. If Stratscore provides a valid proxy for strategy-related annual report commentary 
then an incremental positive increase should be evident in Main Market firms’ reports with fiscal 
year-ends from June 2011 onwards, relative to their AIM counterparts. 
Further evidence regarding construct validity is provided by examining associations 
between StratScore and additional covariates that theory and practice predicts should correlate 
with the strategy-relevant annual report disclosure. However, the absence of a clear identification 
strategy for these variables means that standard concerns in the disclosure literature regarding 
endogeneity bias apply. Findings should therefore be interpreted with this caveat in mind. 
 Prior research highlights a series of firm-level characteristics associated with strategy-
related disclosures. For example, organisationally complex firms are predicted to face more 
scope and greater demand to explain their strategic objectives and priorities (Gu and Li 2007). 
We therefore expect StratScore to be increasing in the degree of organisation complexity. The 
literature also finds a reliable positive association between disclosure levels and firm size. We 
expect this result to carry-over to strategy-related commentary for two reasons. First, large firms 
face greater incentives and pressure to explain and justify their activities to external stakeholders 
as a result of political cost considerations (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Second, large firms 
tend to be characterized by greater operational complexity and as a consequence have more scope 
(and face a higher demand) to explain their objectives and approach to value creation. We 
therefore expect StratScore to correlate positively with firm size. 
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Financing constraints and the demand for external capital have also been linked with the 
provision of information on corporate objectives and business model. On the one hand, investors 
are expected to demand more strategy-related information to help them evaluate the investment 
proposition properly; on the other hand management are expected to face strong incentives to 
elucidate strategy in an effort to reduce information asymmetry and minimize incremental capital 
raising costs. Research confirms that management are more likely to discuss factors affecting 
their external environment when faced with financial constraints (D’Aveni and MacMillan 1990). 
We therefore expect StratScore to be increasing in the demand for external capital. 
An externality of voluntary disclosure that is particularly pertinent to strategy-related 
commentary is proprietary costs arising from the information being exploited by competitors 
(Verrecchia 1983, Darrough 1993). The Department of Business, Skills and Innovation (DBIS) 
identified proprietary costs as the most important factor constraining U.K firms from disclosing 
more information on strategy, principal risks, and opportunities (DBIS 2010). We therefore 
expect StratScore to correlate negatively with competitive intensity. 
Finally, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) was not the first attempt by UK 
regulators to encourage greater disclosure on strategy and approaches to value creation. As part 
of a revision to the 2006 Companies Act requiring all LSE-listed firms to include a business 
review in their annual report, the ASB issued a best practice statement on management 
commentary that encouraged directors to provide commentary on: corporate objectives and 
strategy; resources available to deliver those objectives; risks and uncertainties facing the entity; 
and factors likely to affect the firm’s future development (ASB 2006). The best practice 
guidelines were effective for year-ends on or after March 31, 2006 and survey evidence suggests 
a significant fraction of UK-listed firms applied the guideline even though it was not mandatory 
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(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007). Accordingly, we expect to observe a higher average value of 
StratScore for with year-ends on or after March 31, 2006. 
We test our predictions using the following pooled OLS regression: 
StratScoreit=α0 + α1CGC2010it + α2Mainit + α3CGC2010 × Maini1   
+ α4ASB2006it + α5Segmentsit + α6Sizeit + α7Financeit  (3) 
+ α8Competitionit + ∑ γkControlkit
K
k=1  + εit, 
where variable definitions and associated predictions are as follows. StratScore is defined by 
equation (1). CGC2010 is an indicator variable capturing changes in strategy-related reporting 
provisions in the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 applicable to LSE Main Market firms’ 
annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after June 30, 2011, and zero otherwise. MAIN is an 
indicator variable equal to one for the subset of firms listed on the LSE Main Market and zero for 
firms listed on AIM. Our primary construct validity test predicts an incremental increase in 
StratScore for LSE Main Market firms relative to their AIM counterparts in response to revisions 
to the U.K Corporate Governance Code 2010 (α̂3 > 0). ASB2006 is equal to one for fiscal year-
ends on or after March 31, 2006 and zero otherwise, and captures any structural break in 
disclosure practices associated with the reporting guidelines issued by the ASB (α̂4 > 0).
12 
Segments is the number of operating business segments and is used to proxy for organisational 
complexity (α̂5 > 0). Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and is used to proxy for firm size 
(α̂6 > 0). Finance is an indicator variable equal to one for firms that either (a) display an ex ante 
demand for financing (the firm’s free cash flow over the last three years divided by current assets 
is less than -0.5) or (b) raise finance during the fiscal year via either a seasoned equity issue or a 
                                                 
12 We also present specifications including ASB2006×Main both for completeness and to ensure CGC2010×Main is 
not capturing effects associated with the 2006 regulatory change. We offer no formal prediction for ASB2006×Main, 
although survey evidence by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007) suggests that Main Market firms were quicker to 
respond to the ABS (2006) guidelines than their AIM counterparts. 
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debt issue and it is used to proxy for financing constraints, and zero otherwise (α̂7 > 0). 
Competition is the four-firm concentration ratio (multiplied by minus one) and is used proxy 
for competitive intensity within the sector (α̂8 < 0). 
 Equation (3) also includes a vector of control variables. We include the total number of 
words in the financial statements section of the annual report as a control for overall corporate 
disclosure policy (Wordcount_FS). We also include a proxy for forward-looking commentary 
(Forward). While strategy-related commentary embeds forward-looking disclosures about 
corporate priorities and trends expected to affect future cash flows (Gu and Li 2007, FRC 2014), 
reporting on strategy involves a broader focus. We therefore include the number of forward-
looking words from El-Haj et al. (2018) to ensure StratScore is capturing more than just the 
presence of future-orientated statements. Extant research also highlights poor performance and 
growth opportunities as potential drivers of strategy-related disclosures, although theory and 
empirical evidence yields ambiguous predictions regarding the sign of the associations 
(Diffenbach and Higgins 1987, Gu and Li 2007, Lu and Tucker 2012). We therefore include 
return on assets (ROA) and the book-to-market ratio (BM) as controls for performance and 
growth opportunities, respectively, but offer no directional predictions. We also include the 
lagged value of the dependent variable because strategy and disclosure thereon are likely to be 
sticky over time. Finally, we estimate equation (3) inclusive of industry and time fixed effects. 
Summary statistics for test and control variables are reported in Panel B of Table 2. 
Figure 1 plots sample mean values for StratScore by year and provides qualitative 
insights concerning our main prediction. The StratScore series for both Main Market and AIM 
firms are upward sloping, indicating that the provision of strategy-related commentary increased 
for both groups across the sample period. However, the slope for Main Market firms is 
24 
 
noticeably steeper. ASB (2006) guidelines implemented for fiscal years ending on or after March 
31, 2006 appear to have triggered divergence in strategy reporting practices even though the 
guidelines applied to all listed firms. A more significant divergence in StratScore levels is 
evident following the 2010 revision to the UK Corporate Governance Code. The incremental 
increasing trend in StratScore post-30 June 2011 for Main Market firms is consistent with our 
score capturing regulation-driven changes in strategy-focused commentary.13 Figure 1 also 
supports the DID parallel paths assumption, with less dramatic divergence in strategy reporting 
practices between the two groups evident during the four years prior to June 30, 2011. 
 Summary statistics and coefficient estimates for equation (3) are presented in Table 4. 
Adjusted-R square values range from a high of 74% in Model 4 where we control for the lagged 
value of the dependent variable to a low of 28% in Model 6 where we replace StratScore with a 
scaled version of the measure that controls for an entity’s general disclosure propensity. These 
findings suggest that the predicted drivers of strategy-related disclosure in equation (3) are 
collectively able to explain a substantial amount of the variation in StratScore. 
Model 1 confirms a significant increase in the average level of strategy-focused 
disclosure following implementation of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010. Model 2 
extends the regression to include the CGC2010×Main interaction and as predicted the estimated 
coefficient loads positive and significant, confirming that StratScore detects the incremental 
increase in strategy-related annual report commentary mandated for Main Market firms by the 
2010 revision to the UK Corporate Governance Code. The result is incremental to controls for 
                                                 
13 Figure 1 suggests the presence of learning effects for strategy-related reporting. Although we offer no formal 
prediction regarding such effects, evidence of incremental improvement in the quality of strategy-related 
commentary has been heighted in the professional literature (PwC 2016). An alternative explanation for the deferred 
spike in StratScore is an increase real economy effects involving strategic implications such as growth in merger and 




overall annual report disclosure policy (Wordcount_FS). The positive coefficient on 
CGC2010×Main is also robust to controlling for reporting changes associated with the ASB 
guidelines introduced in 2006 (Model 3), and inclusion of the lagged value of StratScore (Model 
4). CGC2010×Main continues to load in Model 5 after including a proxy for forward-looking 
disclosure, confirming that StratScore captures aspects of strategy-related disclosure incremental 
to and distinct from forward-looking commentary per se. Model 6 includes the text-based proxy 
for competition proposed by Li et al. (2013). The coefficient on CGC2010×Main remains 
positive, consistent with descriptions of business model and strategy extending beyond a 
discussion of competition and StratScore reflecting this broader focus. Finally, Model 7 presents 
results using scaled versions of StratScore and forward-looking disclosure.14 The coefficient 
estimate on CGC2010×Main remains positive and significant at the 0.01 level. 
 Results for additional test variables in equation (3) are also consistent with predictions.  
Segments, Size, Finance and Competition load with their expected coefficient signs and only 
Competition in Models 1-3 and 6 is not significant at conventional levels. ASB2006 loads 
positively in Models 1 and 2 reflecting introduction of the business review guidelines in 2006 
and the specific recommendation for more strategy-related commentary (ASB 2006).15 
Collectively, findings presented in Table 4 suggest that StratScore varies in manner consistent 
with theory and regulatory guidelines concerning strategy-related disclosure.   
 Although findings in Table 4 are robust to controlling for Wordcount_FS and using scaled 
StratScore, it is still possible that the results reflect overall disclosure policy rather than strategy-
                                                 
14 We use the number of words in the financial statements section of the report rather than the number of words in 
the narratives section because the latter includes aspects of strategy-related commentary present in StratScore. In 
contrast, commentary in the financial statements component of the report provides a firm-level measure of disclosure 
propensity that is largely independent of management’s specific reporting policy on strategy.  
15 Results for Models 3 and 4 also support survey evidence from PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007) suggesting that 
traction on the ASB’s guidelines was limited primarily to Main Market firms: the ASB2006 main effect term 
capturing average reporting behaviour by AIM firms is negative while (ASB2006 + ASB2006×Main) is positive. 
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specific reporting. To further assess whether StratScore captures a dimension of disclosure policy 
distinct from the general trend towards longer annual report narratives (EY 2015), we conduct a 
placebo test where StratScore in equation (3) is replaced with measures of aggregate annual 
report narrative disclosure. If results in Table 4 reflect the general increase in disclosures 
unrelated to strategy then CGC2010×Main should continue to load using broader measures of 
annual report narrative commentary. We use two proxies for general report-level disclosure 
policy: the number of words in the financial statements component of the annual report (see 
footnote 16) and the residual word count for the narrative component of the annual report after 
excluding the following three sections where manual inspection suggests strategy-related 
commentary is most often located: summary highlights, the letter from the board chair, and 
management commentary. (This second disclosure proxy provides a particularly tough placebo 
test for StratScore because the residual component of the narratives almost certainly contains 
some strategy-related commentary for some firms.)  Findings using both measures are reported in 
Table 5. The coefficient estimate on CGC2010×Main is indistinguishable from zero in both 
models. Findings suggest that results presented in Table 4 using StratScore are indeed capturing 
strategy-specific annual report disclosures rather than broader disclosure policy. Meanwhile, 
evidence that Segments, Size and Financing continue to load positively in one or both models 
supports the view that these characteristics are associated with overall corporate disclosure policy 
as well as strategy-specific reporting and as such cannot be relied on to provide a definitive 
construct validity test for StratScore.  
Results reported in Tables 4 and 5 confirm StratScore as a valid measure of strategy-
related annual report commentary. Critically, findings suggest that StratScore captures 
disclosures that are distinct from forward-looking commentary, competition, and general trends 
in the volume of annual report content. Evidence also indicates that the structural shift in 
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narrative reporting policy following revision to the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 
centred on strategy-related content rather than annual report commentary more generally. 
 
6. Capital market consequences of enhanced strategy-related disclosure 
6.1 Investor uncertainty  
 Evidence presented in the previous section reveals a structural increase in strategy-related 
annual report commentary among LSE Main Market firms for fiscal year-ends on or after June 
2011 in response to the 2010 revision to UK Corporate Governance Code. In this section we 
exploit the exogenous change in strategy-related reporting for a subset of LSE firms to construct 
a DID test of the capital market consequences of enhanced annual report discussion of the value 
creation process.16 
Consistent with the view that annual report strategy-related commentary establishes a 
broader information framework that helps users resolve uncertainty about firms’ value creation 
process, we test whether increase in strategy-related disclosure reduce information asymmetry in 
the form of dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts, the magnitude of forecast errors on 
earnings and target price, and the bid-ask spread (Lehavy et al. 2011, Hail and Leuz 2006). We 
include analyst-based measures because although analysts likely had private information on 
industry competition, business models and company strategy, survey evidence reported by PwC 
(2006a: 4-5, 2006b: 18) indicates their knowledge was far from complete.  
We use the following OLS regression to evaluate the capital market consequences of 
enhanced reporting on strategy and business model:  
                                                 
16 Figure 1 confirms the validity of the equality of pre-treatment trends assumption. While the operating and 
financial reporting guidelines issued by the ASB (2006) also marked an increase in strategic commentary, the policy 
innovation offers a less promising identification strategy because application was voluntary and the guidelines 












The dependent variable is a proxy for capital market consequences as measured by 
information asymmetry for firm i in fiscal year t+1(m equals earnings forecast dispersion, 
absolute earnings forecast error, absolute price forecast error, or bid-ask spread). Analyst forecast 
dispersion is the standard deviation of individual analyst earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S for year 
t+1 issued during the period between the earnings announcements for year’s t and t+1. Absolute 
forecast errors on earnings are equal to the absolute value of the difference between I/B/E/S 
actual earnings for year t+1 and the initial median I/B/E/S consensus earnings forecast 
outstanding for year t+1 following the announcement of earnings for year t. Absolute forecast 
errors on target prices for year t are equal to the absolute value of the difference between the 
target price following the earning announcement for year t and the 12-month-ahead actual stock 
price (Bilinski et al., 2013). Bid-ask spread is the rolling average of the monthly spread (ask 
minus bid price divided by the average of the bid and ask price) from Datastream computed over 
the fiscal year t+1. All four information asymmetry proxies are scaled by lagged stock price. 
 CGC2010 and Main are defined as in equation (3) and our DID estimator is ?̂?3, which captures 
the incremental change in information imperfections for LSE Main Market firms relative to their 
AIM counterparts in response to the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 strategy reporting 
mandate. We interpret ?̂?3< 0 as evidence that enhanced strategy-related reporting leads to a 
reduction in information asymmetry. Since compliance with the strategy mandate gives firms the 
option of explaining non-disclosure, the perfect compliance assumption underpinning the DID 
approach (Bundell and Dias, 2009) may be violated in our setting, in which case ?̂?3 estimates 
treatment effects for the marginal discloser only (i.e., the marginal treatment effect). In reality, 
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however, few (if any) Main Market firms exercise the non-disclosure option. Finally, Controls is 
a vector of P covariates comprising the CGC2006 indicator variable and its associated two-way 
interaction with Main, factors identified by prior research as effecting information asymmetry in 
the form of firm size (Size), growth options (BM) and operational complexity (Segments), and 
properties of annual report narratives in the form of disclosure propensity (WordCount_FS), 
forward-looking commentary (Forward), and annual report readability proxied by the Fog index 
(Fog) (Li, 2008). 
The initial sample of 9,127 observations is restricted to firms with at least two 
observations in both CGC2010 subperiods. Final sample sizes for each version of equation (4) 
are determined by available observations for the mth CMC proxy. Sample sizes range from 3,399 
where m equals absolute forecast error on price, to 6,027 observations where m equals the bid ask 
spread. All CMC proxies are winsorized at their extreme 0.5 percentiles and log transformed.  
Table 6 reports results for equation (4) estimated using the four proxies for information 
asymmetry. The DID estimator on CGC2010×Main loads negative for all proxies in Table 6, 
although results for absolute forecast errors on price are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Estimated effects on most CMC proxies are also substantively significant. 
For example, the post-2010 decline in price-scaled forecast dispersion is 51 percent larger for 
Main Market firms relative to AIM firms after controlling for all other factors in the model.17 
Comparable effects for absolute price-scaled forecast error (earnings) and price-scaled bid-ask 
spread. Collectively, these findings provide initial evidence that the strategy-related disclosure 
mandate introduced in the 2010 revision of the UK Corporate Governance Code improved the 
disclosure environment for LSE Main Market firms relative to their AIM counterparts.  
                                                 
17 Dependent variables in equation (4) are log transformed and therefore coefficient estimates indicate the percentage 
change in the dependent variable for a one-unit (category) change in a given explanatory variable.   
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Our DID design relies on the untreated sample of AIM firms being otherwise similar to 
our treated sample of Main Market firms. AIM constituents face the same economic conditions 
and financial reporting rules to their Main Market counterparts. Nevertheless, the average AIM 
firm is smaller, more risky, followed by fewer analysts, and faces lower stock market liquidity 
relative to the typical Main Market constituent. We use the synthetic control sample method to 
assess the robustness of our findings to control firm selection (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). 
As this method applies to a strictly balanced sample, we restrict our information asymmetry 
proxy to bid-ask to maximize sample size. We begin by constructing a balanced sample with 
available data over six years surrounding the revision of the UK Corporate Governance Code in 
2010. Following Acemoglu et al. (2016), we match each LSE Main Market (i.e., treated) firm in 
the first year under treatment (i.e. first year where the revision of the code is effective, fiscal year 
2011) to a combination of AIM (i.e., untreated) firms that closely match the treated unit over the 
pre-treatment period fiscal years 2008-2010. Matching is performed using a convex weighting 
matrix that minimizes the Euclidean differences in bid-ask spread on each of the pre-treatment 
periods. Outcomes for the resulting synthetic control sample of AIM firms are then projected into 
fiscal years 2011-2013 using the weights identified by the pre-treatment comparison. Projected 
outcomes for the synthetic control sample represent the counterfactual for the treated unit.  
Findings are presented graphically in Figure 2. Differences in average bid-ask spread 
between Main Market and synthetic control groups are not significant by construction before 
fiscal year 2011. A sharp divergence in information asymmetry between Main Market and AIM 
firms is evident following implementation of the strategy reporting mandate: log spreads drop 
sharply in the first and second treatment years for Main Market firms and remain low thereafter, 
whereas log spreads exhibit a minor drop in the first treatment period followed by a steady rise in 
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the following two years for the synthetic control sample. Conclusions are therefore consistent 
with the DID results reported in Table 6. 
Although results in Table 6 are consistent with enhanced reporting requirements on 
strategy reducing information asymmetry, it is possible that other unmodeled changes in 
governance and reporting practices occurring after 2010 for Main Market firms may be driving 
the results. We address this concern using two approaches. First we re-estimate equation (4) after 
replacing CGC2010×Main with separate interactions on Main for each sample year. Untabulated 
results provide no evidence of an alternative structural break between July 2011 (when the first 
annual reports implementing the new reporting rules were published) and the end of the sample 
period. Further, none of the year interactions load negatively before July 2011. The evidence 
does not support the presence of an alternative cause for the results reported in Table 6 that we 
attribute to the change in strategy-focused reporting. 
Our second approach to assessing the validity of inferences drawn from Table 6 involves 
estimating an alternative specification of equation (4) where the indicator variable Main and its 
two-way interaction with CGC2010 are replaced with a proxy capturing the subset of firms with 
the largest improvement in StratScore from the pre- to the post-mandate period. Using the 
restricted sample of firms with at least two observations in both periods, we construct an 
indicator variable (StratScore_increase) equal to one for firms with a top quartile difference 
between average StratScore computed using pre-mandate observations and average StratScore 
computed using post-mandate observations, and zero otherwise. We also include firm fixed 
effects to account for the endogeneity of the rise in StratScore. Results are reported in Table 7. 
Consistent with the findings presented in Table 6, StratScore_increase loads negatively (p < 
0.05) in all models. Further, coefficient estimates imply economically significant reductions in 
information asymmetry ranging from 30 percent for forecast errors on price to 73 percent for bid-
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ask spread. Evidence of a direct link between improvements in firms’ information environment 
and increases in their StratScore value surrounding the 2010 revision to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code helps alleviate concern that our DID tests reported in Table 6 are capturing the 
effect of other regulatory or economic shocks unrelated to changes in strategy-related 
commentary. We nevertheless acknowledge that these tests cannot rule out completely the 
possibility that the observed reduction in investor uncertainty reflects unspecified reporting and 
governance innovations co-occurring with the 2010 strategy disclosure mandate.   
 
6.2 Price discovery rate 
If strategy-focused management commentary provides a contextualizing framework that 
helps investors better understand the consequences of realized financial and non-financial 
performance for future cash flows then such disclosure may improve the speed with which 
information is incorporated into stock prices following publication of the annual report. Callen et 
al. (2013) discuss how investors’ ability to interpret new information as it arrives is conditioned 
by their pre-existing information set. A clear grasp of an entity’s strategic objectives and business 
model for delivering those objectives arguably provides the core conditioning framework 
necessary to understand the mapping from short-term activities and performance into long-term 
value creation (FRC 2014). Building on Callen et al. (2013), greater transparency about corporate 
strategy should facilitate an improved appreciation of the value creation process and lower 
uncertainty with respect to valuation parameters, as reflected in the speed at which price 
converges to fundamentals. We therefore test for a reduction in the stock price delay in response 
to the structural increase in strategy-related annual report commentary resulting from the 2010 
revision to the UK Corporate Governance Code. Following Hou and Moskowitz (2005) and 
Callen et al. (2013), we approximate the average delay with which information is impounded into 
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stock prices following publication of the annual report using the difference between the 
explanatory power of firm-specific regressions of weekly stock returns on (a) contemporaneous 
and four-lagged weekly market returns and (b) contemporaneous market returns only, estimated 
over the 12-month period following the annual report release. We also construct a firm-specific 
delay measure computed as the difference between the explanatory power of firm-specific 
regressions of weekly stock returns on (a) contemporaneous market and four-lagged firm-specific 
weekly returns and (b) contemporaneous market returns only.  
Table 8 reports results for equation (4) with the CRM proxy equal to stock price delay 
over the 12-month window following the annual report release. For consistency with other CRM 
tests we use log transformed stock price delay measures. Results for the DID model are presented 
in columns 2 and 3. The DID estimator loads negatively in both models as expected, although 
statistical significance is marginal (p < 0.1). A similar pattern is evident in the final two columns 
in Table 8 for models estimated with the StratScore_increase indicator from Table 7 and firm 
fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on StratScore_increase is negative in both models. 
However, statistical significance is marginal and sensitive to the choice of delay proxy. Note also 
that the coefficient estimate on CGC2010 capturing the structural shift for AIM firms is positive 
in all four models, suggesting that stock price delay increased for AIM firms while remaining 
broadly constant for Main Market firms. Results therefore provide weak statistical support 
consistent with enhanced strategy-focused commentary lowering investor uncertainty through 
more rapid assimilation of annual report contents into stock price. 
 
6.3 Cross-sectional analysis 
Our final set of analyses tests whether the information benefits documented in Tables 7 
and 8 vary cross-sectionally with the quality of firms’ information environment prior to the 
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introduction of the strategy reporting mandate. Specifically, we test if the reduction in 
information asymmetry in response to the increase in strategy-focused annual report disclosure is 
more pronounced for firms with poor information environments and low strategic transparency in 
the pre-2010 period, as proxied by low analyst coverage. Analysts generate information about 
strategy and business model through their forecasting and valuation activities. For firms with low 
analyst coverage, externally-generated information on strategic goals and models for long-term 
value creation is likely to be more limited relative to their more intensely followed counterparts. 
In such cases, management commentary on strategy and business model is expected to provide a 
particularly valuable source of information for investors. We therefore test whether reductions in 
information asymmetry in response to increases in strategy-focused annual report commentary 
are more marked for low coverage firms prior to the regulatory change.  
We extend findings reported in Tables 7 and 8 by allowing the coefficient estimate on 
StratScore_increase to vary with the level of analyst coverage. We create an indicator variable 
(LowCover) equal to one for firms in the lowest quartile of the pre-2010 distribution of analyst 
following and then test for a negative coefficient estimate on StratScore_increase×LowCover. 
Results reported in Table 9 confirm that the information benefits to enhanced strategy-focused 
commentary are indeed more pronounced for the low analyst coverage group. As expected, 
StratScore_increase×LowCover loads negatively at the one percent significance level in the 
majority of cases.18 Bid-ask spread is the only information proxy in Table 9 where the 
information gains to enhanced strategy reporting are independent of analyst following. In 
contrast, where the dependent variable is absolute forecast error on earnings and price, the 
incremental coefficient on StratScore_increase×LowCover is more than three times larger in 
                                                 
18 We are unable to present results for forecast dispersion in Table 9 because the variable is indeterminate for 
observations where analyst coverage is very low. 
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magnitude than the corresponding main effect estimate for moderate and high coverage firms; 
and for price delay models reported in the final two columns of Table 9, significant information 
gains are exclusive to low coverage firms. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions  
We develop an objective, replicable measure of strategy-related commentary that we use 
to explore the benefits of enhanced annual report disclosure on strategy and business model. Our 
measure is based on a customized list of strategy-related keywords and phrases drawn from the 
extant strategy literature. To reduce risk of Type I errors we also use an objectively identified 
corpus of strategy commentary to construct a weight for each element in our list that reflects the 
conditional probability that it is used in a strategy context. Construct validity tests confirm our 
measure is a legitimate proxy with which to evaluate the capital market impact of an increase in 
strategy-related annual report disclosure. We therefore proceed to test whether enhanced 
strategy-focused disclosure reduces investor uncertainty proxied by analyst forecast dispersion, 
analyst absolute forecast errors on earnings and price, and bid-ask spread. We also test whether 
the contextualizing role of strategy-related commentary increases the speed of price discovery 
over the 12-month period following publication of the annual report. Our identification strategy 
exploits the 2010 revision to the UK Corporate Governance Code requiring firms with a primary 
listing on the LSE (but not their AIM counterparts) to explain their strategy and business model 
in their annual report. DID results reveal a statistically and economically significant incremental 
decrease in investor uncertainty for LSE primary listing firms in response to the disclosure 
mandate. We also find evidence of a decrease in stock price delay that is particularly pronounced 
for listed firms with low analyst coverage.  
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Two caveats are appropriate when interpreting these results. First, the perfect compliance 
assumption underpinning our DID analysis is almost certainly violated and as such our approach 
estimates treatment effects for the marginal discloser only (i.e., the marginal treatment effect). 
Caution is therefore advised when attempting to generalize treatment effects beyond this group. 
Second, it is possible that other unobserved regulatory changes to governance or reporting 
occurring during the sample window may be responsible for reported improvements in firms’ 
information environment. We address this issue by estimating models using the change in 
strategy-related commentary. Results are broadly consistent with our DID analysis and as such 
provide comfort that our findings reflect changes in the provision of strategy-related annual 
report commentary, although we acknowledge that we cannot rule out other effects entirely.   
Theory and practice stress the potential benefits to capital market participants associated 
with a clear understanding of firms’ objectives and their approach to creating and preserving 
value. In response, best practice reporting guidelines increasingly promote disclosures on 
strategy and business model. A small body of work examines the causes and consequences of 
voluntary strategic plan disclosures outside the annual report. However, despite increasingly loud 
calls from regulators and investors for management to provide more strategy-focused 
commentary in their annual reports, the capital market impact of such disclosures has not been 
examined. Our analysis speaks to this question and provides the first systematic evidence that 
providing strategy-focused annual report commentary can help improve the quality of firms’ 
information environment. The findings are timely given the SEC’s request for views on 




Appendix A: Procedure to construct business model and strategy wordlist 
This appendix describes the procedure used to identify the 709 words and phrases 
(hereinafter referred to as n-grams, where n is ≥ 1) used as the basis for our StratScore measure 
of management commentary on strategy and business model. The basis for our strategy-focused 
list of n-grams is all elements included in the indexes of the following five leading textbooks on 
business strategy: Porter (1985), Barney and Clark (2007), Rumelt (2011), Magretta (2012), and 
Grant (2013). For completeness, we supplement this list with the 517 strategy-related key terms 
reported by Ronda-Pupol and Guerras-Martin (2012, Appendices 1a through 1c) in their corpus 
analysis of the evolution of the concept of strategy in the academic literature.  
Pooling the contents from these six strategy sources yields an initial unedited list of 4,384 
n-grams. The resulting list was then curated manually by members of the research via three 
rounds of edits aimed at minimizing the Type I error rate and maximizing parsimony. The first 
editing round applied the following two exclusion criteria:  
 Proper nouns (e.g., names of firms, authors, managers, countries, sectors, products, etc.) 
unrelated to strategy, which if retained will introduce Type I errors in our frequency counts;  
 Duplicate use of the same n-gram by one or more authors. 
Applying these criteria resulted in the exclusion of 801 n-grams. The refined list of 3,584 distinct 
n-grams is available in an Excel worksheet titled “master list of 3,584 original unique phrases” 
(hereinafter “master list”) via an online appendix (DOI: 10.17635/lancaster/researchdata/232). 
The worksheet also includes the original source(s) of each n-gram. 
The second round of edits involved three members of the research team working 
collectively to identify further candidates for exclusion based on the following two criteria:   
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 Terms that are either generic and unlikely to be linked directly to strategy (e.g., “economics”, 
“governance”, “investments”, etc.) or sufficiently general such that while they may occur in 
strategy-related commentary they are also likely to appear frequently in non-strategy-focused 
disclosures (e.g., “profit”, “asset”, “cost”, etc.). Retaining such terms will result in a high 
Type I error rate.  These exclusions are marked in yellow in the master list Excel worksheet; 
 Complex or idiosyncratic terms that are so unique that the processing cost of retained the 
term for regular expression comparisons outweighs the probability of the term appearing in 
normal written English. Examples include “offensive strategy competitor interrelationship” 
(Porter 1985), “joint venture agreements and strong form trustworthiness” (Barney and Clark 
2007), and “advantage and silver machine problem” (Rumelt 2011). These exclusions are 
marked in green in the master list Excel worksheet.    
N-grams that survived this second editing round are marked in red in the master list Excel 
worksheet. Finally, the third editing sought to simplify the interim wordlist. Specifically, we 
applied the following exclusion criteria aimed at identifying shorter n-grams that captured an 
aspect of strategy and which formed part of at least one of the phrases in the interim list: 
 Redundancy due to inclusion of multiple versions of the same underlying construct. For 
example, the index for Grant (2013) includes the following terms all relating to core strategic 
concept of bargaining power: “bargaining power bilateral monopolies”, “bargaining power 
cost advantage”, and “bargaining power internationalization”. In this case we replaced 
multiple redundant phrases with the single n-gram “bargaining power”;  
 Ambiguities associated with acronyms and case-sensitive representations that require the 
addition of disambiguation conditions. For example, “aim” may be related to strategy 
commentary whereas the acronym for Alternative Investment Market is not strategy-related. 
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Similarly, “international” may feature in strategy commentary whereas “International” is 
more likely to be part of a firm name where it does not occur at the start of a sentence; 
In addition, we also applied inclusion criterion designed to incorporate both English and 
American English spelling (e.g., “centralise” and “centralize”) and to ensure complete coverage 
of alternative versions of multiword expressions. For example, while the initial master list 
includes several representations of research and development (e.g., “R and D”, “Research and 
Development” and “research and development”), other feasible presentations such as “R&D” 
and “Research & Development” would be excluded unless the expressions are added manually. 
Similarly, while the initial mater list includes “switching costs” (Grant, 2013, Margretta 2012, 
Porter 1985), the natural alternative representation “cost of switching” would be excluded 
without this manual intervention step. Finally and where appropriate, we applied lemmatization 
to selected elements to ensure various inflections (including plurals) are captured.  
This third round of edits involved two co-authors applying inclusion criteria to each n-
gram independently, with disagreements resolved by a third co-author. Retained n-grams were 
then considered independently by two co-authors for inflecting or lemmatizing, with a third co-
author again serving as judge where disagreements occurred. This refining and cleaning process 
occurred over multiple iterations resulting in a final list of 709 n-grams (including inflections, 
alternative spellings, and alternative representations of the same term or phrase).  
The final list of 709 n-grams is presented in Table A1, partitioned between the 231 n-
grams with a positive weight in the calculation of StratScore (Panel A) and the remaining 478 n-
grams that receive a zero weight in the StratScore calculation (Panel B). The list is also available 
via an online appendix that provides a full reconciliation to the 3,584 n-grams in the original 
master list (doi 10.17635/lancaster/researchdata/232). 
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Table A1 List of 709 strategy-focused n-grams used to compute StratScore. N-grams preceded by (L), (U) and 
(LU) are lower case only, upper case only, and lower or upper case, respectively. # indicates lemmatizing.  
Panel A: 231 n-grams with a non-zero weighting in final StratScore measure 
Abilities creati# innovative performance monitoring 
Ability cultural innovator# performance target# 
adapt# culture intellectual property pioneering 
advantage# customer# internal environment# plant size 
Aim customiz# internal organisation political factor# 
Aiming decentralis# internalis# portfolio management 
Aims decentraliz# internationalisation predatory 
ambition# defensive interrelate# principles 
analytic# tool# demand-side invent procurement 
Attack demographic# invest profit measure# 
attack# deploy investing profit pool# 
Attractive differentiat# job satisfaction property rights 
attractiveness distribution channel# know-how proprietary 
balanced scorecard divers# knowledge purchasing asset# 
barrier# to entry driver KPI purchasing power 
behavior# drivers lead time# qualification cost# 
behaviour# economies of scale leader# quality 
benchmark# efficien# lead-time# range of business# 
best practice# elastic legal constraints reliance on 
bottom up emerging leveraged rely on 
bottom-up employee# leveraging reputation# 
brand# employment cost# life cycle resource- 
Bundling enhanc# life-cycle respond 
business model# entrepreneur# local# responding 
business process# entry long term responsiveness 
business scope environmental factor# long-term risk# 
business system# equilibrium low cost roadmap 
capabilit# evolv# low-cost scalable 
centraliz# exclusive M & A scale 
centre# of excellence experience curve M&A scope 
cluster# fail# managers scorecard 
co operation failure markets seller# 
co ordinat# firm level maximise profit# service 
cohesiveness first mover measure# of profit shared 
collaborat# first-mover merger# & acquisition# shareholder 
commercialis# flexibility merger# and acquisition# sharing 
commodity product# focus# mission shift# 
compete follower# multi-business# shifting 
competenc# fragment# multiple skill# 
competing game chang# network effect# social factor# 
competitive game-chang# network of social policy 
competitive advantage# geographic next big thing social responsibility 
competitive force# global# norms socially responsible 
competitor# goal# objectiv# specializ# 
complement# growth operat# effectiveness stakeholder# 
complexity hands-on management operations management standardis# 
containment heterogeneity opportunism strateg# 
coordinat# holistic organisational structure stream# of profit# 
core competenc# human capital our network# superior 
corporate portfolio incubate out sourc# supply-side 
cost driver# incubating out-sourc# sustain# 
cost improvement# inflection point# performance criteria switch back 
cost# of switching innovate# performance indicator# switching back 
create# innovation# performance measure# synerg# 
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target# trade off utilise value# 
team-based uncertain# utilization vision 
technical# unique utilize  
technolog# uniqueness value chain  
Panel B: 478 n-grams with zero weighting in final StratScore measure 
acquire buyer type# condition of duplication dominant 
acquisition# buyer value configur# dominate 
activit# buyer# need# conflict# downstream channel# 
administrat# costs buyer# perception# conglomerate downturn 
administrat# distance buyer/supplier consolidate dynamic 
alliance# buyer-supplier consolidating economic# 
ambitious capacit# consolidation economies of scope 
analysis capital cost# continuity economy of scale 
analytic# framework carried out control of timing economy of scope 
anti business carry out conventional wisdom emergent 
anti compet# carrying out conventional-wisdom emotional climate 
anti trust causal ambiguity cooperate emotional intelligence 
antibusiness center# of excellence co-operate enabl# 
anti-business centralis# cooperating engineering overreach 
anticompet# centralised direction co-operating enter 
anti-compet# centralised redirection cooperation entered 
antitrust centralised-direction co-operation entering 
anti-trust centralised-redirection co-ordinat# entrant 
armï¿½s length contract# centralized direction corner solution entry barrier# 
armï¿½s-length contract# centralized redirection cost advantage# envelopment manoeuvre 
arms length contract# centralized-direction cost disadvantage# evolution# 
arms-length contract# centralized-redirection cost leader# exclusiveness 
asset assignment chain link cost leading exclusivity 
asset# purchase# chain of value cost# of sharing execut# 
assign# asset# chain-link crisis exit barrier# 
assignment of asset# challeng# cross licens# exit# 
attain# chang# cross subsidi# exogenous 
attitude survey# cherry pick# cross-licens# experience goods 
bargaining power cherry-pick# cross-subsidi# exploit# 
barrier# to exit co operate customis# external 
barrier# to imitation co operating decision# external environment# 
barrier# to mobility coalign# demand financial interrelat# 
beachhead# co-align# deployment# 
financial management 
system# 
blocking position# coalition# deregulation firm specific 
blueprint cognitive factor# design firm-level 
boundar# cognitive map# deterren# firm-specific 
bundle coherence develop# fit 
bundled coherent diffusion force# 
business identity# cohesion disadvantage# franchisee 
business linkage# cohesive disinvest# franchiser 
business unit# commercializ# dispos# franchising 
business-process# comparative advantage# disrupt# franchisor 
buyer cost comparative disadvantag# dissonance functional 
buyer performance competition distribution of assets geographical 
buyer power competitive disadvantage# divest# hands off management 
buyer purchase criteria complex division of labor hands on management 
buyer segment# concentration division of labour hands-off management 
headwind# licensing organizational identity quantity 
heterogeneous location organizational intelligence R & D 
hierarch# locational difference# organizational rigidity R and D 
horizontal organisation longer term organizational routinization R&D 
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horizontal organization longer-term organizational slack real option# 
horizontal structure loss of coherence organizational structure recession# 
horizontal system# lower cost outsourc# reciprocal dealing 
hostile takeover# lower-cost patent# reconfigur# 
HR macroscenario# path dependen# reengineer# 
imitability macro-scenario# penetrate re-engineer# 
imitat# make or buy penetration refutation 
imitation barrier# make-or-buy perception# of buyer# regime of appropriability 
immobility barrier# management control performance analysis region# 
impact on profit# management system# performance control relational contract# 
implement# management team# performance diagnosis relationship 
incubator managerial talent performance incentive# relative cost 
incumbent mapping personnel rotation repetitive 
indivisibilit# market pioneer reposition# 
industrial buyer# marketing costs pioneered research 
industries marketing spend plan research & development 
industry matrix organisatio# plann# research and development 
inelastic matrix organizatio# plans resource# 
inertia maximize profit# political distance response 
information system# milestone# position restructur# 
information technolog# mobility barrier# positive feedback retaliate 
infrastructure monopolies power of buyers retaliation 
input cost# monopoly preempt# revolutionary 
institutional factor# mov# to action pre-empt# revolutionise 
intangibl# multibusiness# price cut# revolutionize 
integrat# multifunctional units price discrimination rival# 
intend multi-functional units price movement# road map 
intent national price premium road-map 
interfirm network# need# of buyer# price sensitive# routinis# 
inter-firm network# network externalit# pricing routiniz# 
internal force# new entrant# privileged information rules for riches 
internal organization next big-thing process# salience effect# 
internaliz# obscuring profit product# satisfactory 
international obstacl# product-line satisfic# 
internationalization operat# relatedness profit maximis# scale economies 
interrelationship# operating organisation# profit maximiz# scale economy 
invested operating organization# profit source# scenario analysis 
investment in opportunit# profit stream# scenarios 
investments in organisation# redesign profitab# schumpeterian shock# 
invisible asset# organisational analysis program# of action scope economies 
IP organisational decisions promotion from within scope economy 
IPR organisational design proposal# secto# 
isolating mechanism organisational ecology protection of turf segment# 
IT organisational identity proximate objective# self organisation 
joint ventur# organisational intelligence psychographic# self organise 
judgement organisational rigidity psychological contract self organization 
leading organisational routinisation psychological factor# self organize 
leadtime# organisational slack purchase criteri# self-organisation 
lean production organization# redesign purchase occasion self-organise 
leapfrog# organizational analysis purchase power self-organization 
leap-frog# organizational decisions purchase# of asset# self-organize 
learning organizational design purchased input cost# sense of purpose 
learning-by-doing organizational ecology pursue sentiment 
separation standards supplier transfer# 
series of actions Static supply trust# 
shape stealth marketing survey of attitude# type of buyer 
shaped strength# surviv# utilisation 
Shaping structural analysis switch cost# utilised 
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signal# structural break# switch-back utilising 
social equity stuck in the middle switched back utilized 
social herding stuck-in-the-middle switching cost# utilizing 
social legitimacy sub technolog swot weaken# 
social system# substitut# tail-risk# weakness# 
source# of profit sub-technolog takeover# win 
sourcing choice# subtechnolog# task# winner 
specialis# succeed# team based winning 
Spillover success factor# team production wins 
standalone influence success# threat#  
standardiz# superiority trade-off  
Our starting point for the list is the indexes of following five leading business strategy textbooks: Porter (1985), Barney and Clark (2007), 
Rumelt (2011), Magretta (2012) and Grant (2013). For completeness, we also include n-grams reported by Ronda-Pupol and Guerras-
Martin (2012, Appendices 1a through 1c). The initial pooled list comprised 4,384 words and phrases, which reduced to 3,584 following 
exclusion of proper nouns (firms, products and authors) and other irrelevant content. The resulting list was then curated manually and 
independently by two members of the research team to: (a) remove generic words such as “profit”, “industry”, and “asset” that are unlikely 
to discriminate between strategy-specific content and other aspects of management commentary; (b) simplify or generalize n-grams and 
lemmatize keywords; (c) expand the list to include inflections and plurals, and alternative English or American spellings; and (d) add 
disambiguation conditions. Disagreements between coders were reviewed and reconciled. The final list of strategy n-grams comprises 709 
elements that nest 2,907 (81%) of the 3,584 words and phrases from the initial list. A full reconciliation from the initial to the final list is 





Appendix B: Using StratScore to estimate strategy-related annual report narrative content 
This appendix summarizes the mapping from our strategy-related weighted word count metric 
(StratScore) into total report commentary on business model and strategy, and estimates the average 
incremental increase in strategy-related commentary for Main Market firms (over their AIM 
counterparts) in response the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 reporting mandate. We use the 
following model to project StratScore into page content: 
Pagecount
i1
= δ0 + 𝛿1StratScoreit + ωit (1B) 
where Pagecount is the total number of pages in the narrative component of the annual report relating to 
fiscal year t published by firm i, StratScore is our report-level weighted frequency of strategy-related 
words, ?̂?1is our estimate of the average mapping from strategy words into total report content,  ?̂?0 is an 
estimate of pages in the average annual report whose content is unrelated to business model and strategy, 
and  is the regression residual.  
 Panel A of Table B1 reports findings for equation 1B. The first row presents estimates for the 
pooled sample using all years. Based on the mean StratScore value of 21.3 reported in Panel A of Table 
2 for the full sample, the coefficient estimate on StratScore of 0.68 for the pooled sample implies that 15 
pages of narratives in an average report contain at least some discussion relating to the value creation 
process. The sample mean number of narrative annual report pages is 28, implying that marginally more 
than half the pages in the narrative section of the average annual report contain some discussion relating 
to the value creation process. The final rows of Panel A present results for equation 1B estimated 
separately using pre-strategy disclosure mandate data for Main Market and AIM firms.  
Panel B of Table B1 pairs coefficient estimates on StratScore with strategy-related page count 
for the pre- and post-strategy mandate periods. Findings indicate an implied incremental change in 
average strategy-related page count for Main Market firms of 11 pages relative to AIM firms (i.e., a 
13.98-page increase for Main Market firms compared with a 2.93-page increase for AIM firms). 
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Table B1: Implied aggregate annual report discussion on the value creation process based on StratScore 
Panel A: Summary statistics for OLS regressions of narrative page count on StratScore 
 Intercept StratScore R2 N 
Pooled sample (all years) 13.699 0.677 0.6349 9,127 
 (0.01) (0.01)   
Main Market sample (pre-mandate) 20.987 0.548 0.5255 3,130 
 (0.01) (0.01)   
AIM sample (pre-mandate) 10.318 0.563 0.3627 3,380 
 (0.01) (0.01)   
 
Panel B: Implied page count for annual report discussion on the value creation process  
  Implied page count for 
strategy-related content 

 in implied 
 
  CGC2010 = 0 CGC2010 = 1 page count  
Sample 
AIM 5.56 8.49 2.93  
Main Market 14.49 28.47 13.98  
Panel A reports coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for narrative page count on StratScore (two-tailed probability values 
reported in parentheses). Panel B uses the StratScore coefficient estimates from Panel A in conjunction with the mean StratScore value for 
the corresponding Main Market and AIM samples to estimate the average total page count in the narrative section of the annual report that 
containing commentary relating to the value creation process. Note the approach does not assume the entire page deals exclusively with 
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Table 1 Sample selection and descriptive properties 
Panel A: Sample selection criteria   
  Reports 
Population of annual reports between January 2003 and December 2014  15,954 
Less:   
Unprocessed annual reports  (1,656)  
Extraction process likely resulting in material error  (3,855)  
Missing identifiers from Datastream (9)  
Multiple reports during the fiscal year (e.g. change in year ends)  (76)  
Missing accounting and market data for explanatory variables (1,231)  
Final sample  9,127 
Panel B: Distribution of final sample by firms and calendar year 
Count of obs. by firm N % of total  Count of obs. by year N % of total 
1 241 13.68  2002 205 2.25 
2 231 13.11  2003 609 6.67 
3 213 12.09  2004 683 7.48 
4 156 8.85  2005 747 8.18 
5 150 8.51  2006 857 9.39 
6 156 8.85  2007 884 9.69 
7 141 8.00  2008 907 9.94 
8 153 8.68  2009 847 9.28 
9 115 6.53  2010 778 8.52 
10 206 11.69  2011 790 8.66 
    2012 671 7.35 
    2013 729 7.99 
    2014 420 4.60 






Table 2 Summary statistics for StratScore measure strategic commentary and covariates used in large-
sample statistical validation tests of StratScore. The sample consists of 9,127 firm-year observations for 
1,762 firms over the period 2003-2014. 
Variables Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3  
Panel A: Strategy-related commentary     
Raw strategy count 159 178   45 99 203 
Probability weight 0.103 0.007 0.099 0.103 0.107 
StratScore 21.278 24.209 5.896 13.023 26.834 
StratScore scaled 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Panel B: Covariates      
CGC2010 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ABS2006 0.78 0.42 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Main 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Segments 2.24 1.57 1.00 2.00 3.00 
Size 10.98 2.32 9.37 10.80 12.47 
Financing 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Competition  -0.81 0.18 -0.98 -0.85 -0.71 
ROA  -0.12 0.56 -0.09 0.02 0.07 
BM 0.70 1.01 0.26 0.52 0.93 
Wordcount_FS 17,066 11,842 9,403 14,440 21,027 
Forward 234 203 91 165 312 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for strategy-related annual report content. Raw strategy count is the number of strategy 
words appearing the annual report for firm i in year t, based on the list of 709 n-grams presented in Appendix A. Probability 
weight is the conditional probability from equation (2) that any given section from the pooled sample of J annual reports is as an 
objectively identified strategy section based on the frequency with which n-gram k appears in that section. StratScore is our 
primary measure of strategy-related commentary. It weights counts of the kth n-gram in our list by Probability weight. The 
weighting approach assigns a weight of zero to any n-gram k that never appears in the corpus of objectively identified strategy-
focused commentary. Weights are also set to zero for any k that has a lower proportion of occurrences in the strategy corpus 
relative to the full annual report narratives corpus. Applying these zero weights reduces from 709 to 231 the number of non-zero 
weighted elements from K and therefore StratScore for report j equals the weighted sum of frequency counts for 231 n-grams. 
StratScore scaled is equal to StratScore divided by total number of words in the financial statements component of the 
corresponding annual report. Variables reported in Panel B are defined as follows. CGC2010 is an indicator variable equal to one 
for annual reports for accounting periods ending on or after 30 June 2011 (post-revision of the UK Corporate Governance Code), 
and zero otherwise. ASB2006 is an indicator variable equal to one for annual reports for accounting periods ending on or after 31 
March 2006 (post-introduction of the Business Review in annual reports), and zero otherwise. Main is an indicator variable equal 
to one for firms-years registered on the London Stock Exchange Main Market and zero otherwise. ROA is return on assets. 
Segments is the number of business segments for firm i at the end of year t. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in year t. 
BM is the book to market ratio. Financing is an indicator variable equal to one if either (1) operating cash flows minus average 
capital expenditure from years t - 3 through to year t - 1 (scaled by current assets in t - 1) is less than 0.5 (Dechow et al. 1996) or 
(2) the firm raises capital in t as evidenced by a positive value for proceeds from equity issues (WC04251) or the annual increase 
in total debt exceeds five percent; and zero otherwise. Competition is an industry-year measure equal to minus one multiplied by 
the sum of the market share (measured by revenue) for industry j in fiscal year t of the four largest firms ranked by revenue in 
industry j. WordCount_FS is the word count for the financial statements component of the annual report, comprising the auditors' 
report, statement of directors' responsibilities, financial statements and notes to the accounts, statutory shareholder information, 
statutory five-year summaries, subsidiaries and their locations, and information regarding the annual general meeting (where 
included). Forward is the number of forward-looking words in the narratives component of annual report, all annual sections 
other than: auditors' report, statement of directors' responsibilities, financial statements and notes to the accounts, statutory 
shareholder information, statutory five-year summaries, subsidiaries and their locations, and information regarding the annual 
general meeting (where included). 
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Table 3. Classification accuracy of Statscore relative to gold standard manual classification.  























Low (N = 20) 21   18 16  2 88.89 5 76.19 
Medium (N = 20) 10   12 6  6 50.00 4 60.00 
High (N = 20) 16   17 14  3 82.35 2 87.50 
Total 47 13  47 36  13 73.47 11 76.60 
StratScore is our primary measure of strategy-related commentary. It weights counts of the kth n-gram in our list of 709 strategy-
related words and phrases by the conditional probability from equation (2) that any given section from the pooled sample of J 
annual reports is as an objectively identified strategy section based on the frequency with which n-gram k appears in that section. 
The weighting approach assigns a weight of zero to any n-gram k that never appears in the corpus of objectively identified strategy-
focused commentary. Weights are also set to zero for any k that has a lower proportion of occurrences in the strategy corpus relative 
to the full annual report narratives corpus. Applying these zero weights reduces from 709 to 231 the number of non-zero weighted 
elements from K and therefore StratScore for report j equals the weighted sum of frequency counts for 231 n-grams. “Disclosure 
category” in column one refers to the relative quality of strategy-related annual report commentary. Twenty reports for each of the 
three categories are selected at random based on their Stratscore ranking for the full sample: reports classified as High are 
associated with a Stratscore value in the top quartile; reports classified as Low are associated with a Stratscore value in the bottom 
quartile; and reports classified as Medium are drawn from all remaining observations. Reports are presented blind (i.e., no 
information on the reports’ original classification and no details of the number of reports selected from each category) to two 
domain experts who each classify reports into one of the three groups independently. Domain experts’ classifications agree for 47 
reports (78%), which serve as the gold standard classification against which Stratscore’s ability to reproduce similar rankings is 
assessed. Precision values are equal to the number of true positives divided by the sum of true positives and false positives 
(multiplied by 100). Recall values are equal to the number of true positives divided by the sum of true positives and false negatives 





Table 4 Coefficient estimates and summary statistics for OLS regressions of StratScore on factors related 
to firms’ reporting and business environment, and to management incentives. The sample consists of 9,127 
firm-year observations for 1,762 firms over the period 2003-2014. Variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 0.5 percentile. Two-tailed t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 








Variables sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept ? -66.756*** -49.261*** -43.729*** -56.887*** -12.033** -4.968 -0.007*** 
  (-7.39) (-6.50) (-6.28) (-20.64) (-2.46) (-1.15) (-4.25) 
CGC2010  12.540** 2.369 3.392 -1.264* 6.616*** 6.671*** 0.003*** 
  (2.19) (1.06) (1.59) (-1.65) (4.88) (6.69) (2.94) 
Main   1.327 -4.145*** -2.295*** -4.210*** -3.823*** -0.000 
   (0.86) (-3.94) (-5.70) (-5.06) (-5.22) (-0.01) 
CGC2010 x Main +  15.503*** 13.158*** 4.942*** 5.231*** 3.522*** 0.004*** 
   (4.86) (4.38) (3.19) (4.28) (3.29) (3.97) 
ABS2006  + 3.646*** 3.666*** -0.551 -2.996*** 1.049* -0.161 0.000 
  (6.55) (6.47) (-0.83) (-4.15) (1.85) (-0.34) (0.36) 
ASB2006 x Main     7.981*** 3.834*** 2.961*** 1.917** 0.002* 
    (5.19) (6.85) (3.23) (2.18) (1.90) 
Segments + 0.859*** 0.806*** 0.822*** 0.223* 0.474** 0.570** 0.000* 
  (3.60) (3.27) (3.35) (1.77) (1.98) (2.48) (1.89) 
Size + 5.906*** 5.019*** 5.011*** 2.123*** 1.428*** 0.784*** 0.002*** 
  (10.32) (12.34) (12.43) (10.89) (5.59) (4.10) (15.98) 
Financing  + 1.175*** 1.731*** 1.714*** 1.047*** 1.059*** 0.822** 0.001*** 
  (2.66) (3.76) (3.73) (3.67) (2.92) (2.43) (3.40) 
Competition   -4.845 -3.761 -3.585 -3.623** -6.429*** -5.306
** 0.000 
  (-1.38) (-1.28) (-1.35) (-2.39) (-2.70) (-2.24) (0.13) 
StratScoret-1  +    0.691***  -0.053  
     (32.22)  (-0.23)  
ROA  -2.392*** -1.897*** -1.943*** -0.348** -0.398 -0.626*** -0.000* 
  (-5.43) (-5.07) (-5.44) (-2.19) (-1.40) (-2.61) (-1.73) 
BM  -2.375*** -1.982*** -1.928*** -0.936*** -0.884*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
  (-4.76) (-4.67) (-4.47) (-3.76) (-2.94) (0.68) (-4.96) 
Wordcount_FS   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.053*** -0.000*** 
  (4.46) (4.53) (4.57) (2.77) (2.42) (17.11) (-8.04) 
Forward      0.073***   
      (19.84)   
LiScore       0.547***  
       (15.28)  
Forward scaled        0.102*** 
        (5.12) 
Time indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  9,127 9,127 9,127 7,628 9,127 9,217 9,127 
Adjusted R2  0.5207 0.5465 0.5503 0.7380 0.6682 0.6618 0.2800 
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Table 4 continued 
The dependent variable in columns 3-7 is the unscaled value of StratScore computed using the annual report for fiscal year t 
published by firm i. StratScore is equal to the weighted frequency count of 231 n-grams from final strategy wordlist described in 
Appendix A, where weights are equal to the conditional probability that n-gram k is associated with commentaries that 
unambiguously contain strategy-related content. Results presented in the final column are estimated using StratScore scaled, which 
is equal to StratScore divided by total number of words in the financial statements component of the corresponding annual report 
and multiplied by 10 to aid presentation. Definitions for explanatory variables are as follows. CGC2010 is an indicator variable 
equal to one for annual reports for accounting periods ending on or after 30 June 2011 (post-revision of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2010), and zero otherwise. Main is an indicator variable equal to one for firms-years registered on the London 
Stock Exchange Main Market and zero otherwise. ASB2006 is an indicator variable equal to one for annual reports for accounting 
periods ending on or after 31 March 2006 (post-introduction of the Business Review in annual reports), and zero otherwise. 
Segments is the number of business segments for firm i at the end of year t. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in year t. 
Financing is an indicator variable equal to one if either (1) operating cash flows minus average capital expenditure from years t - 3 
through to year t - 1 (scaled by current assets in t - 1) is less than 0.5 (Dechow et al. 1996) or (2) the firm raises capital in t as 
evidenced by a positive value for proceeds from equity issues (WC04251) or the annual increase in total debt exceeds five percent; 
and zero otherwise. Competition is an industry-year measure equal to minus one multiplied by the sum of the market share 
(measured by revenue) for industry j in fiscal year t of the four largest firms ranked by revenue in industry j. StratScoret-1 is the 
lagged value of the dependent variable. ROA is return on assets. BM is the book to market ratio. WordCount_FS is the word count 
for the financial statements component of the annual report, comprising the auditors' report, statement of directors' responsibilities, 
financial statements and notes to the accounts, statutory shareholder information, statutory five-year summaries, subsidiaries and 
their locations, and information regarding the annual general meeting (where included). Forward is the number of forward-looking 
words in the narratives component of annual report, all annual sections other than: auditors' report, statement of directors' 
responsibilities, financial statements and notes to the accounts, statutory shareholder information, statutory five-year summaries, 
subsidiaries and their locations, and information regarding the annual general meeting (where included). LiScore is the unscaled 
competition measure proposed by Li et al. (2013) based on frequency counts of “competition”, “competitor”, “competitive”, 
“compete”, and “competing” including those words with an “s” appended, and then remove any case where “not,” “less,” “few,” or 
“limited” precedes the word by three or fewer words. Forward scaled is equal to Forward divided by WordCount_FS. All variables 
are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentile.
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Table 5. Placebo tests regressing non-strategy-related word counts on factors related to firms’ reporting and 
business environment, and to management incentives. The sample consists of 9,127 firm-year observations 
for 1,762 firms over the period 2003-2014. Two-tailed t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 
five, and one percent levels, respectively. 
Variable Wordcount_FS Wordcount_AR_Resid 
Intercept -2,501.701 13,712.366*** 
 (-0.72) (23.48) 
Main -1,177.777 -360.303*** 
 (-1.59) (-3.11) 
CGC2010 170.399 75.803 
 (0.33) (0.52) 
CGC2010×Main -1,736.557 500.168 
 (-1.49) (1.44) 
ASB2006 -2,602.608*** 13.704 
 (-6.29) (0.06) 
ASB2006×Main  2,003.069* 425.540 
 (1.91) (1.46) 
Segments  571.032*** -20.561 
 (4.69) (-0.43) 
Size 2,006.913*** 198.687*** 
 (13.63) (6.17) 
Financing  220.074 196.718** 
 (0.80) (2.28) 
Competition  1,045.048 1,177.941** 
 (0.78) (2.45) 
ROA -1,445.725*** -120.128** 
 (-5.86) (-2.45) 
BM -84.868 -15.605 
 (-1.53) (-0.59) 
Forward 10.199*** 9.758*** 
 (8.22) (15.06) 
Time indicators Yes Yes 
Industry indicators Yes Yes 
Observations 9,127 9,127 
Adj. R-squared (%) 46.07 43.87 
The dependent variable in column 2 is the word count for the financial statements component of the annual report, comprising the 
auditors' report, statement of directors' responsibilities, financial statements and notes to the accounts, statutory shareholder 
information, statutory five-year summaries, subsidiaries and their locations, and information regarding the annual general meeting 
(where included). The dependent variable in column 3 is the residual word count for the narrative component of the annual report 
after excluding the following three sections where manual inspection suggests strategy-related commentary is most often located: 
summary highlights, the letter from the board chair, and management commentary. Definitions for covariates are provided in Tables 
3 and 4. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentile.
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Table 6 Coefficient estimates and summary statistics for OLS regressions of log transformed investor 
uncertainty proxies on an indicator variable for an exogenous increase in strategy-related commentary. 
The sample is restricted to include firms with a least two observations in both subperiods. Superscripts *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the 10, five, and one percent levels (two-tailed tests), respectively. Two-
tailed t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year.  
















Intercept 0.996** -5.642*** -2.514*** 7.114*** 
 (2.26) (-15.48) (-7.78) (16.11) 
Main 0.374*** 0.110 -0.167 -0.281 
 (3.00) (0.93) (-1.54) (-1.30) 
CGC2010  0.077 -0.140 0.079 0.206 
 (0.44) (-0.48) (0.29) (0.52) 
CGC2010Main  -0.505*** -0.371** -0.209 -1.043*** 
 (-4.49) (-2.13) (-1.22) (-4.11) 
ASB2006   -0.241 -0.578** -0.662** -0.715** 
 (-1.10) (-2.18) (-2.19) (-2.37) 
Size -0.228*** -0.024 -0.146*** -1.056*** 
 (-5.72) (-0.72) (-5.17) (-31.80) 
BM 0.368*** 0.125*** 0.088** 0.426*** 
 (7.43) (2.73) (2.01) (4.56) 
Segments 0.010 0.029 -0.008 0.032 
 (0.39) (1.05) (-0.36) (1.17) 
Time  0.019 0.100** 0.045 0.101* 
 (0.54) (2.26) (0.93) (1.72) 
Wordcount_FS 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.75) (-0.44) (0.68) (0.41) 
Forward  9.275*** 4.090 1.135 0.431 
 (2.63) (1.16) (0.40) (0.10) 
Fog -0.005 0.005 0.012** 0.011* 
 (-0.90) (0.88) (2.35) (1.78) 
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,149 3,947 3,399 6,027 
Adjusted R2 0.1419 0.0650 0.1485 0.7236 
The dependent variables in columns 3-6 are defined as follows. Forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of individual 
analyst earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S issued during the financial fiscal year, divided by lagged price. Absolute forecast error 
(earnings) is the absolute value of the forecast error scaled by lagged price, where forecast error is the difference between the 
I/B/E/S actual EPS and the initial median analyst consensus forecast immediately following the announcement of earnings for 
previous fiscal year. Absolute forecast error (prices) is the absolute value of the forecast error in target prices, where forecast 
error in target prices is the difference between the target price following announcement of annual earnings and actual stock price 
12 months thereafter. Bid-ask spread is the average monthly spread (ask minus bid price divided by the average of the bid and 
ask price) during the financial year divided by lagged price. All four investor uncertainty proxies are log transformed. Definitions 
for covariates are provided in Tables 3 and 4, with the exception of Fog which is the fog index of annual report readability and 
Time which is a linear time-trend variable equal to calendar year minus 2003. The sample is based on 9,127 firm-year 
observations for 1,762 firms over the period 2003-2014. Sample sizes vary across models according to the data available for the 
corresponding dependent variable. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentile or top 0.5 percentile when 
bounded at zero.  
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Table 7 Coefficient estimates and summary statistics for OLS regressions of log transformed investor 
uncertainty proxies on an indicator variable for increases in StratScore post-2010 and a vector of control 
variables Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, five, and one percent levels 
(two-tailed tests), respectively. Two-tailed t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
















Intercept -0.619 -3.577** 1.388 -2.767*** 
 (-0.66) (-2.52) (0.88) (-6.52) 
Main -0.013 -0.370 -0.003 -0.761*** 
 (-0.05) (-0.95) (-0.01) (-3.90) 
CGC2010  -0.060 -0.171 -0.112 -0.139 
 (-0.36) (-0.71) (-0.50) (-0.36) 
StratScore_increase -0.317*** -0.396*** -0.305** -0.735*** 
 (-2.80) (-3.09) (-2.04) (-3.33) 
ASB2006   -0.109 -0.522** -0.645** -0.757** 
 (-0.45) (-2.14) (-2.23) (-2.55) 
Size -0.332*** 0.037 -0.421*** -0.680*** 
 (-3.15) (0.41) (-4.44) (-7.24) 
BM 0.409*** 0.098 0.088 0.168** 
 (6.77) (1.29) (1.26) (1.98) 
Segments 0.065** 0.045 -0.017 0.002 
 (2.27) (1.25) (-0.52) (0.10) 
Time  -0.010 0.073 0.100** 0.091 
 (-0.24) (1.51) (2.49) (1.48) 
WordCount_FS 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.47) (0.14) (-0.82) (-0.31) 
Forward 2.748 -0.385 -0.821 0.547 
 (0.98) (-0.10) (-0.35) (0.22) 
Fog 0.001 0.005 0.011 0.004 
 (0.20) (1.04) (1.53) (0.97) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,149 3,947 3,399 6,027 
Adjusted R2 0.4502 0.3675 0.3154 0.8854 
The dependent variables are log transformed proxies for investor uncertainty (see Table 6 for definitions). Explanatory variables 
are defined in Table 6 with the exception of StratScore_increase which is an indicator variable taking the value of one for with 
the top quartile change in the average value of StratScore from the pre- to the post-2010 period. The sample is restricted to firms 
with a least two observations in both the pre- and post-2010 period. Sample sizes vary across models according to the availability 
of data for the corresponding dependent variable. All variables are winsorized at the extreme 0.5 percentiles or top 0.5 percentile 




Table 8 Coefficient estimates and summary statistics for OLS regressions of log transformed stock price 
delay proxies on an indicator variable for an exogenous increase in strategy-related commentary and an 
indicator variable for increases in StratScore post-2010. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, five, and one percent levels (two-tailed tests), respectively. Two-tailed t-statistics 
(reported in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
Variables Stock price delay Stock price delay_fs  Stock price delay Stock price delay_fs 
Intercept 6.220*** 7.163***  2.781 1.247 
 (19.14) (18.16)  (1.25) (1.08) 
Main 0.035 -0.048  0.137 -0.015 
 (0.18) (-0.30)  (0.36) (-0.04) 
CGC2010  0.504 0.714***  0.582* 0.715*** 
 (1.21) (2.58)  (1.82) (3.45) 
CGC2010Main  -0.478* -0.319*    
 (-1.76) (-1.65)    
StratScore_increase    -0.285* -0.049 
    (-1.85) (-1.27) 
ASB2006   -0.923*** -0.901***  -0.878** -0.904*** 
 (-2.83) (-3.06)  (-2.46) (-3.17) 
Size -0.370*** -0.433***  -0.281*** -0.294*** 
 (-10.29) (-12.92)  (-7.92) (-6.63) 
BM 0.168*** 0.185***  0.199*** 0.166*** 
 (4.19) (5.33)  (3.87) (4.03) 
Segments 0.016 0.020  0.009 0.004 
 (0.83) (0.94)  (0.23) (0.08) 
Time  0.168** 0.131***  0.126* 0.116** 
 (2.51) (2.65)  (1.80) (2.13) 
Wordcount_FS 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.29) (0.36)  (-0.08) (-1.03) 
Forward  -7.420*** -6.565**  -7.022*** -4.634 
 (-2.90) (-2.27)  (-2.87) (-1.42) 
Fog -0.003 -0.004  0.004 0.002 
 (-0.38) (-0.54)  (0.55) (0.27) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No  Yes Yes 
N 9,061 9,061  6,531 6,531 
Adjusted R2 0.0990 0.1385  0.1577 0.1952 
Dependent variables reflect the average delay with which information is impounded into stock prices following the annual report 
release, calculated using firm-specific regressions of weekly stock returns on contemporaneous weekly market returns and four 
lags for the 12-month period following publication of the annual report. Stock price delay is equal to one minus the ratio of the R2 
from the restricted version of the model (all explanatory variables other than the intercept set to zero) and the R2 from the 
corresponding unrestricted model. Stock price delay_fs is computed using the same process as used to compute Stock price delay 
but with the four lags of weekly market return replaced by four lags of weekly firm-specific return. Both stock price delay 
variables are log transformed. The sample consists of 9,061 firm-year observations over the period 2003-2014 with available data 
on stock price delay. Explanatory variables are defined in Table 7. All variables are winsorized at the extreme 0.5 percentiles or 





Table 9. Coefficient estimates and summary statistics for OLS regressions of log transformed information asymmetry proxies on an indicator 
variable for post-2010 increases in StratScore, conditional low analyst following in the pre-2010 period. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, five, and one percent levels (two-tailed tests), respectively. Two-tailed t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. 





Bid-ask spread Stock price delay Stock price delay_fs 
Intercept  -3.582** 1.388 -0.888 2.762 3.688*** 
 (-2.52) (0.88) (-1.15) (3.21) (3.02) 
Main -0.370 -0.003 -0.760*** 0.129 -0.023 
 (-0.95) (-0.01) (-3.89) (0.34) (-0.06) 
CGC2010 -0.170 -0.112 -0.139 0.581* 0.714*** 
 (-0.71) (-0.50) (-0.36) (1.81) (3.42) 
StratScore_increase -0.393*** -0.305** -0.742*** -0.222 0.012 
 (-3.05) (-2.04) (-3.33) (-1.28) (0.07) 
StratScore_increase×LowCover -1.414*** -1.059*** 0.343 -2.256*** -2.186*** 
 (-8.07) (-2.67) (1.10) (-2.75) (-3.16) 
LowCover 4.137*** 0.753* 8.147*** -1.477*** -1.758*** 
 (9.40) (1.69) (16.27) (-9.44) (-5.88) 
ASB2006 -0.521** -0.645** -0.756** -0.888** -0.914*** 
 (-2.14) (-2.23) (-2.54) (-2.47) (-3.16) 
Size 0.037 -0.421*** -0.680*** -0.279*** -0.292*** 
 (0.41) (-4.44) (-7.24) (-7.91) (-6.41) 
BM 0.099 0.088 0.168** 0.199*** 0.165*** 
 (1.30) (1.26) (1.98) (3.89) (4.03) 
Segments 0.045 -0.017 0.002 0.009 0.004 
 (1.25) (-0.52) (0.10) (0.23) (0.09) 
Time 0.073 0.100** 0.091 0.126* 0.116** 
 (1.51) (2.49) (1.48) (1.80) (2.12) 
Wordcount_FS 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.13) (-0.82) (-0.31) (-0.08) (-1.02) 
Forward -0.386 -0.821 0.564 -7.115*** -4.724 




Table 9 continued 
Fog 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.003 
 (1.04) (1.53) (0.96) (0.57) (0.29) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,947 3,399 6,027 6,531 6,518 
Adj. R-squared 0.3674 0.3154 0.8854 0.1585 0.1960 
LowCover is an indicator variable taking the value of one for firms whose analyst coverage in the pre-2010 period is in the lowest quartile of analyst following for the sample. 






Figure 1 Mean StratScore by fiscal year for firms listed on the London Stock Exchange Main Market and 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM). The sample consists of 9,127 firm-year observations for 1,762 
firms over the period 2003-2014. 
 
StratScore is equal to the weighted frequency count of 231 n-grams from final strategy wordlist described in Appendix A, where 
weights are equal to the conditional probability that n-gram k is associated with commentaries that unambiguously contain 
strategy-related content. The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) issued the best practice statement on management commentary, 
Reporting Standard 1 Operating and Financial Review, encouraging annual report narrative commentary on: corporate objectives 
and strategy; resources available to deliver those objectives; risks and uncertainties facing the entity; and trends and factors likely 
to affect the firm’s future development (ASB 2006). The best practice guidelines were effective for year-ends ending on or after 
March 31, 2006 and applied to all LSE-listed firms (Main Market and AIM). Paragraph C.1.2 of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2010), effective for accounting periods beginning on or after June 29, 2010, required LSE Main Market firms (but not their 
AIM counterparts) to explain in their annual report the basis on which for generating or preserving value over the longer term 
































Figure 2. Plots of mean bid-ask spread (logged) based on the synthetic control sample method (Abadie 
and Gardeazabal 2003). 
 
Plots are based on a balanced sample of firms with available data for years surrounding the revision of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) effective for accounting periods beginning on or after June 29, 2010 (fiscal year 2011 first effective 
period of implementation) The solid (blue) line relates to firms listed on the LSE Main market. The dashed (red) line relates to a 
synthetic control group. Following Acemoglu et al. (2016), each treated unit (i.e. Main market firms in the first year of treatment, 
i.e. fiscal year 2011) is matched to a combination of untreated units (i.e., AIM firms) that closely match the treated unit over the 
pre-treatment period (FY2008-FY2010). Matching is performed using a convex weighting matrix that minimizes the Euclidean 
differences in bid-ask spread on each of the pre-treatment periods. Outcomes for this synthetic control sample, are then projected 
in the post-treatment period (FY2011-FY2013) using the weights identified by the pre-treatment comparison. These projected 
outcomes are used as the counterfactual for the treated unit. By construction the differences in bid-ask spreads between the two 
groups are not significant before FY2011.  
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